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I. Moot Court: Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia; Altitude Express,
Inc. v. Zarda
Moot Court: Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia; Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda
“SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW APPLIES TO GAY
AND TRANSGENDER WORKERS”
Adam Liptak
“ON L.G.B.T. RIGHTS, THE SUPREME COURT ASKS THE QUESTION”
Linda Greenhouse
“SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON GAY, TRANSGENDER EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS”
Jess Bravin and Brent Kendall
“COURT TO TAKE UP LBGT RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE”
Amy Howe
“TITLE VII AND LGBT DISCRIMINATION: THE PATH TO THE HIGH COURT”
Melissa Legault
“THIS LANDMARK RULING COULD BRING LOGIC TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS”
Caroline Polisi
“TWO NEW PETITIONS CALL ON SCOTUS TO DECIDE WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS FOR GAYS,
LESBIANS”
Alison Frankel
“11TH CIRC. DRAWS JUDGE’S IRE WITH EN BANC REVIEW REFUSAL”
Kat Green
“11TH CIRCUIT JOINS OTHERS IN HOLDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION NOT
COVERED TITLE VII”
Julie Furer Stahr
“2ND CIRCUIT DEMOLISHES KEY DOJ ARGUMENT AGAINST WORKPLACE PROTECTION FOR
GAYS”
Alison Frankel
“2ND CIRCUIT (AGAIN) FINDS ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION LEGAL UNDER TITLE VII”
Chris Johnson
“TRUMP’S BATTLE OVER LGBT DISCRIMINATION IS JUST BEGINNING”
Emma Green
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Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia
Ruling Below: Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 Fed. Appx. 964 (11th Cir. 2018)
Overview: Bostock brings employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. He argued that the County discriminated against him based on sexual orientation and
gender stereotyping. The County contends that Bostock was terminated due to the improper
handling of CASA funds. The district court dismissed based on failure to state a claim.
Issue: Whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes
prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
Gerald Lynn BOSTOCK, Plaintiffs—Appellant
v.
CLAYTON COUNTY Board of Commissions, Defendant, Clayton County, Defendant—
Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on May 10, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
TJOFLAT, WILSON, and NEWSOM,
Circuit Judges, PER CURIAM:

under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Issues
not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned.
Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees on the
basis of their sex. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a).
This circuit has previously held that
“[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not
prohibited by Title VII.” And we recently
confirmed that Blum remains binding
precedent in this circuit. In Evans, we
specifically rejected the argument that
Supreme Court precedent in Oncale v.

Gerald Lynn Bostock appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his employment
discrimination suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2(a)(1), against Clayton County,
Georgia, for failure to state a claim. On
appeal, Bostock argues that the County
discriminated against him based on sexual
orientation and gender stereotyping. After a
careful review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm. “We review de novo the
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
27

Sundowner Offshore Servs., and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supported a cause of
action for sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII.
As an initial matter, Bostock has abandoned
any challenge to the district court’s dismissal
of his gender stereotyping claim under Glenn
because he does not specifically appeal the
dismissal of this claim. Moreover, the district
court did not err in dismissing Bostock’s
complaint
for
sexual
orientation
discrimination under Title VII because our
holding in Evans forecloses Bostock’s claim.
And under our prior panel precedent rule, we
cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding,
regardless of whether we think it was wrong,
unless an intervening Supreme Court or
Eleventh Circuit en banc decision is issued.
AFFIRMED.
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Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda
Ruling Below: Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d. Cir. 2018)
Overview: This is a case concerning employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Don
Zarda was terminated from his skydiving business employment after disclosing his sexual
orientation to a client. He sued under the New York Human Rights Law and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Zarda claimed that in addition to discrimination based on his sexual
orientation, he was also discriminated for his gender. The defendants contend that Zarda’s Title
VII claim should be dismissed because Zarda repeatedly testified that he believed the termination
reason was because of his sexual orientation.
Issue: Whether the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1), against employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination
based on an individual’s sexual orientation.
Melissa ZARDA, co-independent executor of the estate of Donald Zarda, and William
Allen Moore, Jr., co-independent executor of the estate of Donald Zarda, Appellant
v.
ALTITUDE EXPRESS, INC., doing business as Skydive Long Island, and Ray Maynard,
Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on February 26, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
KATZMANN, Chief Judge:

discrimination "because of ... sex," we have
previously held that sexual orientation
discrimination claims, including claims that
being
gay
or
lesbian
constitutes
nonconformity with a gender stereotype, are
not cognizable under Title VII.

Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor,
brought a sex discrimination claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII") alleging that he was fired from
his job at Altitude Express, Inc., because he
failed to conform to male sex stereotypes by
referring to his sexual orientation. Although
it is well-settled that gender stereotyping
violates Title VII's prohibition on

At the time Simonton and Dawson were
decided, and for many years since, this view
was consistent with the consensus among our
sister circuits and the position of the Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC" or "Commission"). But legal
doctrine evolves and in 2015 the EEOC held,
for the first time, that "sexual orientation is
inherently a 'sex-based consideration;'
accordingly an allegation of discrimination
based on sexual orientation is necessarily an
allegation of sex discrimination under Title
VII." Since then, two circuits have revisited
the question of whether claims of sexual
orientation discrimination are viable under
Title VII. In March 2017, a divided panel of
the Eleventh Circuit declined to recognize
such a claim, concluding that it was bound by
Blum , 597 F.2d at 938, which "ha[s] not been
overruled by a clearly contrary opinion of the
Supreme Court or of [the Eleventh Circuit]
sitting en banc ." One month later, the
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, took "a fresh
look at [its] position in light of developments
at the Supreme Court extending over two
decades" and held that "discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination.” In addition, a concurring
opinion of this Court recently called "for the
Court to revisit" this question, emphasizing
the "changing legal landscape that has taken
shape in the nearly two decades since
Simonton issued," and identifying multiple
arguments that support the conclusion that
sexual orientation discrimination is barred by
Title VII.

prior precedents held otherwise, they are
overruled.
We therefore VACATE the district court's
judgment on Zarda's Title VII claim and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court in all other
respects.
BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural history of this case
are discussed in detail in our prior panel
decision. See Zarda v. Altitude Express , 855
F.3d 76, 79–81 (2d Cir. 2017). We recite
them only as necessary to address the legal
question under consideration.
In the summer of 2010, Donald Zarda, a gay
man, worked as a sky-diving instructor at
Altitude Express. As part of his job, he
regularly participated in tandem skydives,
strapped hip-to- hip and shoulder-to-shoulder
with clients. In an environment where close
physical proximity was common, Zarda's coworkers routinely referenced sexual
orientation or made sexual jokes around
clients, and Zarda sometimes told female
clients about his sexual orientation to assuage
any concern they might have about being
strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. That
June, Zarda told a female client with whom
he was preparing for a tandem skydive that
he was gay "and ha[d] an ex- husband to
prove it." Although he later said this
disclosure was intended simply to preempt
any discomfort the client may have felt in
being strapped to the body of an unfamiliar
man, the client alleged that Zarda
inappropriately touched her and disclosed his

Taking note of the potential persuasive force
of these new decisions, we convened en banc
to reevaluate Simonton and Dawson in light
of arguments not previously considered by
this Court. Having done so, we now hold that
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation as discrimination
"because of ... sex." To the extent that our
30

sexual orientation to excuse his behavior.
After the jump was successfully completed,
the client told her boyfriend about Zarda's
alleged behavior and reference to his sexual
orientation; the boyfriend in turn told Zarda's
boss, who fired shortly Zarda thereafter.
Zarda denied inappropriately touching the
client and insisted he was fired solely because
of his reference to his sexual orientation.

his
claim
for
sexual
orientation
discrimination under New York law, plaintiff
had failed to establish a prima facie case of
gender stereotyping discrimination under
Title VII.
While Zarda's remaining claims were still
pending, the EEOC decided Baldwin, holding
that "allegations of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a
claim of discrimination on the basis of sex."
The Commission identified three ways to
illustrate what it described as the
"inescapable link between allegations of
sexual orientation discrimination and sex
discrimination." First, sexual orientation
discrimination, such as suspending a lesbian
employee for displaying a photo of her
female spouse on her desk while not
suspending a man for displaying a photo of
his female spouse, "is sex discrimination
because it necessarily entails treating an
employee less favorably because of the
employee's sex." Second, it is "associational
discrimination" because "an employee
alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is alleging that his or her
employer took his or her sex into account by
treating him or her differently for associating
with a person of the same sex." Lastly, sexual
orientation
discrimination
"necessarily
involves discrimination based on gender
stereotypes,"
most
commonly
"heterosexually defined gender norms."
Shortly thereafter, Zarda moved to have his
Title VII claim reinstated based on Baldwin .
But, the district court denied the motion,
concluding that Simonton remained binding
precedent.

One month later, Zarda filed a discrimination
charge with the EEOC concerning his
termination. Zarda claimed that "in addition
to being discriminated against because of
[his] sexual orientation, [he] was also
discriminated against because of [his]
gender." In particular, he claimed that "[a]ll
of the men at [his workplace] made light of
the intimate nature of being strapped to a
member of the opposite sex," but that he was
fired because he "honestly referred to [his]
sexual orientation and did not conform to the
straight male macho stereotype."
In September 2010, Zarda brought a lawsuit
in federal court alleging, inter alia , sex
stereotyping in violation of Title VII and
sexual orientation discrimination in violation
of New York law. Defendants moved for
summary judgment arguing that Zarda's Title
VII claim should be dismissed because,
although "Plaintiff testifie[d] repeatedly that
he believe[d] the reason he was terminated
[was] because of his sexual orientation ... [,]
under Title VII, a gender stereotype cannot be
predicated on sexual orientation." In March
2014, the district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants on the Title VII
claim. As relevant here, the district court
concluded that, although there was sufficient
evidence to permit plaintiff to proceed with
31

Zarda's surviving claims, which included his
claim for sexual orientation discrimination
under New York law, went to trial, where
defendants prevailed. After judgment was
entered for the defendants, Zarda appealed.
As relevant here, Zarda argued that Simonton
should be overturned because the EEOC's
reasoning in Baldwin demonstrated that
Simonton was incorrectly decided. By
contrast, defendants argued that the court did
not need to reach that issue because the jury
found that they had not discriminated based
on sexual orientation.

defendants argue that any decision on the
merits would be an advisory opinion because
Zarda did not allege sexual orientation
discrimination in his EEOC charge or his
federal complaint and therefore the question
of whether Title VII applies to sexual
orientation discrimination is not properly
before us.
Irrespective of whether defendants' argument
is actually jurisdictional, its factual premises
are patently contradicted by both the record
and the position defendants advanced below.
Zarda's EEOC complaint explained that he
was "making this charge because, in addition
to being discriminated against because of
[his] sexual orientation, [he] was also
discriminated against because of [his]
gender." Zarda specified that his supervisor
"was hostile to any expression of [his] sexual
orientation that did not conform to sex
stereotypes," and alleged that he "was fired ...
because ... [he] honestly referred to [his]
sexual orientation and did not conform to the
straight male macho stereotype." Zarda
repeated this claim in his federal complaint,
contending that he was "an openly gay man"
who was "discharge[ed] because of a
homophobic customer" and "because his
behavior did not conform to sex stereotypes,"
in violation of Title VII.

The panel held that "Zarda's [federal] sexdiscrimination claim [was] properly before
[it] because [his state law claim was tried
under] a higher standard of causation than
required by Title VII." However, the panel
"decline[d] Zarda's invitation to revisit our
precedent," which "can only be overturned by
the entire Court sitting in banc." The Court
subsequently ordered this rehearing en banc
to revisit Simonton and Dawson 's holdings
that
claims
of
sexual
orientation
discrimination are not cognizable under Title
VII.
DISCUSSION
I.

JURISDICTION

We first address the defendants' challenge to
our jurisdiction. Article III of the
Constitution grants federal courts the
authority to hear only "Cases" and
"Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.
1. As a result, "a federal court has neither the
power to render advisory opinions nor 'to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights
of litigants in the case before them.' " The

Defendants plainly understood Zarda's
complaint to have raised a claim for sexual
orientation discrimination under Title VII. In
their motion for summary judgment,
defendants argued that Zarda's claim "relies
on the fact that Plaintiff is homosexual, not
that he failed to comply with male gender
norms. Thus, Plaintiff merely attempts to
bring a defective sexual orientation claim
32

under Title VII, which is legally invalid." The
district court ultimately agreed.

"regardless of whether the discrimination is
directed against majorities or minorities." As
a result, we have stated that "Title VII should
be interpreted broadly to achieve equal
employment opportunity."

Having interpreted Zarda's Title VII claim as
one for sexual orientation discrimination for
purposes of insisting that the claim be
dismissed, defendants cannot now argue that
there is no sexual orientation claim to prevent
this Court from reviewing the basis for the
dismissal. Both defendants and the district
court clearly understood that Zarda had
alleged sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII. As a result, Zarda's Title VII
claim is neither unexhausted nor unpled, and
so it may proceed.
II.

In deciding whether Title VII prohibits
sexual orientation discrimination, we are
guided, as always, by the text and, in
particular, by the phrase "because of ... sex."
However, in interpreting this language, we do
not write on a blank slate. Instead, we must
construe the text in light of the entirety of the
statute as well as relevant precedent. As
defined by Title VII, an employer has
engaged in "impermissible consideration of
... sex ... in employment practices" when "sex
... was a motivating factor for any
employment practice," irrespective of
whether the employer was also motivated by
"other factors." Accordingly, the critical
inquiry for a court assessing whether an
employment practice is "because of ... sex" is
whether sex was "a motivating factor."

SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION

A. The Scope of Title VII
"In passing Title VII, Congress made the
simple but momentous announcement that
sex, race, religion, and national origin are not
relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees." The text of
Title VII provides, in relevant part:

Recognizing that Congress intended to make
sex "irrelevant" to employment decisions,
Griggs , the Supreme Court has held that
Title VII prohibits not just discrimination
based on sex itself, but also discrimination
based on traits that are a function of sex, such
as life expectancy, Manhart, and nonconformity with gender norms, Price
Waterhouse. As this Court has recognized,
"any
meaningful
regime
of
antidiscrimination law must encompass such
claims" because, if an employer is " '[f]ree to
add non-sex factors, the rankest sort of
discrimination' " could be worked against
employees by using traits that are associated
with sex as a proxy for sex. Applying Title

It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge ... or
otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
This "broad rule of workplace equality,"
"strike[s] at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment" based on protected characteristics,
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VII to traits that are a function of sex is
consistent with the Supreme Court's view that
Title VII covers not just "the principal evil[s]
Congress was concerned with when it
enacted" the statute in 1964, but also
"reasonably comparable evils" that meet the
statutory requirements.

discrimination based on the employee's own
sex.

With this understanding in mind, the question
before us is whether an employee's sex is
necessarily a motivating factor in
discrimination based on sexual orientation. If
it is, then sexual orientation discrimination is
properly understood as "a subset of actions
taken on the basis of sex."

We begin by considering the nature of sexual
orientation discrimination. The term "sexual
orientation" refers to "[a] person's
predisposition or inclination toward sexual
activity or behavior with other males or
females" and is commonly categorized as
"heterosexuality,
homosexuality,
or
bisexuality." To take one example,
"homosexuality" is "characterized by sexual
desire for a person of the same sex." To
operationalize this definition and identify the
sexual orientation of a particular person, we
need to know the sex of the person and that
of the people to whom he or she is attracted.
Because one cannot fully define a person's
sexual orientation without identifying his or
her sex, sexual orientation is a function of
sex. Indeed sexual orientation is doubly
delineated by sex because it is a function of
both a person's sex and the sex of those to
whom he or she is attracted. Logically,
because sexual orientation is a function of sex
and sex is a protected characteristic under
Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation is
also protected.

1. Sexual Orientation as a Function of
Sex
a. "Because of ... sex"

B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a
Subset of Sex Discrimination
We now conclude that sexual orientation
discrimination is motivated, at least in part,
by sex and is thus a subset of sex
discrimination. Looking first to the text of
Title VII, the most natural reading of the
statute's prohibition on discrimination
"because of ... sex" is that it extends to sexual
orientation discrimination because sex is
necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.
This statutory reading is reinforced by
considering the question from the perspective
of sex stereotyping because sexual
orientation discrimination is predicated on
assumptions about how persons of a certain
sex can or should be, which is an
impermissible basis for adverse employment
actions. In addition, looking at the question
from the perspective of associational
discrimination,
sexual
orientation
discrimination —which is motivated by an
employer's
opposition
to
romantic
association between particular sexes—is

Choosing not to acknowledge the sexdependent nature of sexual orientation,
certain amici contend that employers
discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation can do so without reference to
sex. In support of this assertion, they point to
Price Waterhouse , where the Supreme Court
34

observed that one way to discern the
motivation behind an employment decision is
to consider whether, "if we asked the
employer at the moment of the decision what
its reasons were and if we received a truthful
response, one of those reasons would be" the
applicant or employee's sex. Relying on this
language, these amici argue that a "truthful"
response to an inquiry about why an
employee was fired would be "I fired him
because he is gay," not "I fired him because
he is a man." But this semantic sleight of
hand is not a defense; it is a distraction. The
employer's failure to reference gender
directly does not change the fact that a "gay"
employee is simply a man who is attracted to
men. For purposes of Title VII, firing a man
because he is attracted to men is a decision
motivated, at least in part, by sex. More
broadly, were this Court to credit amici 's
argument, employers would be able to rebut
a discrimination claim by merely
characterizing their action using alternative
terminology. Title VII instructs courts to
examine employers' motives, not merely their
choice of words. As a result, firing an
employee because he is "gay" is a form of sex
discrimination.

for example, sexual harassment and hostile
work environment claims, both of which
were initially believed to fall outside the
scope of Title VII's prohibition.
In 1974, a district court dismissed a female
employee's claim for sexual harassment
reasoning that "[t]he substance of [her]
complaint [was] that she was discriminated
against, not because she was a woman, but
because she refused to engage in a sexual
affair with her supervisor." The district court
concluded that this conduct, although
"inexcusable," was "not encompassed by
[Title VII]." The D.C. Circuit reversed.
Unlike the district court, it recognized that
the plaintiff "became the target of her
supervisor's sexual desires because she was a
woman ." (emphasis added). As a result the
D.C. Circuit held that "gender cannot be
eliminated from [plaintiff's formulation of
her claim] and that formulation advances a
prima facie case of sex discrimination within
the purview of Title VII" because "it is
enough that gender is a factor contributing to
the discrimination." Today, the Supreme
Court and lower courts "uniformly"
recognize sexual harassment claims as a
violation of Title VII, notwithstanding the
fact that, as evidenced by the district court
decision in Barnes , this was not necessarily
obvious from the face of the statute.

The argument has also been made that it is
not "even remotely plausible that in 1964,
when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable
person competent in the English language
would have understood that a law banning
employment discrimination 'because of sex'
also banned discrimination because of sexual
orientation[.]" Even if that were so, the same
could also be said of multiple forms of
discrimination
that
are
indisputably
prohibited by Title VII, as the Supreme Court
and lower courts have determined. Consider,

The Supreme Court has also acknowledged
that a "hostile work environment," although
it "do[es] not appear in the statutory text,"
violates Title VII by affecting the
"psychological aspects of the workplace
environment[.]"As Judge Goldberg, one of
the early proponents of hostile work
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environment claims, explained in a case
involving national origin discrimination,

Congress might not have contemplated that
discrimination "because of ... sex" would
encompass sexual orientation discrimination
does not limit the reach of the statute.

[Title VII's] language evinces a
Congressional intention to define
discrimination in the broadest
possible terms. Congress chose
neither to enumerate specific
discriminatory practices, nor to
elucidate in extenso the parameter of
such nefarious activities. Rather, it
pursued the path of wisdom by being
unconstrictive, knowing that constant
change is the order of our day and that
the seemingly reasonable practices of
the present can easily become the
injustices of the morrow.

The dissent disagrees with this conclusion. It
does not dispute our definition of the word
"sex," nor does it argue that this word had a
different meaning in 1964. Instead, it charges
us with "misconceiv[ing] the fundamental
public meaning of the language of" Title VII.
at 143 (emphasis omitted). According to the
dissent, the drafters included "sex" in Title
VII to "secure the rights of women to equal
protection in employment," and had no
intention of prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination. We take no position on the
substance of the dissent's discussion of the
legislative history or the zeitgeist of the
1960s, but we respectfully disagree with its
approach to interpreting Title VII as well as
its conclusion that sexual orientation
discrimination is not a "reasonably
comparable evil," to sexual harassment and
male-on-male
harassment.
Although
legislative history most certainly has its uses,
in ascertaining statutory meaning in a Title
VII case, Oncale specifically rejects reliance
on "the principal concerns of our legislators,"
—the centerpiece of the dissent's statutory
analysis. Rather, Oncale instructs that the
text is the lodestar of statutory interpretation,
emphasizing that we are governed "by the
provisions of our laws." The text before us
uses
broad
language,
prohibiting
discrimination "because of ... sex," which
Congress defined as making sex "a
motivating factor." We give these words their
full scope and conclude that, because sexual
orientation discrimination is a function of
sex, and is comparable to sexual harassment,

Stated differently, because Congress could
not anticipate the full spectrum of
employment discrimination that would be
directed at the protected categories, it falls to
courts to give effect to the broad language
that Congress used.
The Supreme Court gave voice to this
principle of construction when it held that
Title VII barred male-on-male sexual
harassment, which "was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII," and which few
people in 1964 would likely have understood
to be covered by the statutory text. But the
Court was untroubled by these facts.
"[S]tatutory prohibitions," it explained,
"often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed." Applying this
reasoning to the question at hand, the fact that
36

gender stereotyping, and other evils long
recognized as violating Title VII, the statute
must prohibit it.

majority's comparison changed "two
variables—the plaintiff's sex and sexual
orientation." In other words, the Seventh
Circuit compared a lesbian woman with a
heterosexual man. As an initial matter, this
observation helpfully illustrates that sexual
orientation is a function of sex. In the
comparison, changing Hively's sex changed
her sexual orientation. Case in point.

b. “But for” an Employee’s Sex
Our conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme
Court's test for determining whether an
employment practice constitutes sex
discrimination. This approach, which we call
the "comparative test," determines whether
the trait that is the basis for discrimination is
a function of sex by asking whether an
employee's treatment would have been
different "but for that person's sex." To
illustrate its application to sexual orientation,
consider the facts of the recent Seventh
Circuit case addressing a Title VII claim
brought by Kimberly Hively, a lesbian
professor who alleged that she was denied a
promotion because of her sexual orientation.
Accepting that allegation as true at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, the Seventh Circuit
compared Hively, a female professor
attracted to women (who was denied a
promotion), with a hypothetical scenario in
which Hively was a male who was attracted
to women (and received a promotion). Under
this scenario, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that, as alleged, Hively would not have been
denied a promotion but for her sex, and
therefore sexual orientation is a function of
sex. From this conclusion, it follows that
sexual orientation discrimination is a subset
of sex discrimination.

But the real issue raised by the government's
critique is the proper application of the
comparative test. In the government's view,
the appropriate comparison is not between a
woman attracted to women and a man
attracted to women; it's between a woman
and a man, both of whom are attracted to
people of the same sex. Determining which
of these framings is correct requires
understanding the purpose and operation of
the comparative test. Although the Supreme
Court has not elaborated on the role that the
test plays in Title VII jurisprudence, based on
how the Supreme Court has employed the
test, we understand that its purpose is to
determine when a trait other than sex is, in
fact, a proxy for (or a function of) sex. To
determine whether a trait is such a proxy, the
test compares a female and a male employee
who both exhibit the trait at issue. In the
comparison, the trait is the control, sex is the
independent variable, and employee
treatment is the dependent variable.
To understand how the test works in practice,
consider Manhart. There, the Supreme Court
evaluated the Los Angeles Department of
Water's requirement that female employees
make larger pension contributions than their
male colleagues. This requirement was based
on mortality data indicating that female

The government, drawing from the dissent in
Hively, argues that this is an improper
comparison. According to this argument,
rather than "hold[ing] everything constant
except the plaintiff's sex" the Hively
37

employees outlived male employees by
several years and the employer insisted that
"the different contributions exacted from
men and women were based on the factor of
longevity rather than sex." Applying "the
simple test of whether the evidence shows
treatment of a person in a manner which but
for that person's sex would be different," the
Court compared a woman and a man, both of
whose pension contributions were based on
life expectancy, and asked whether they were
required to make different contributions.
Importantly, because life expectancy is a sexdependent trait, changing the sex of the
employee (the independent variable)
necessarily affected the employee's life
expectancy and thereby changed how they
were impacted by the pension policy (the
dependent variable). After identifying this
correlation, the Court concluded that life
expectancy was simply a proxy for sex and
therefore the pension policy constituted
discrimination "because of ... sex."

for men. Therefore, by changing the
plaintiff's gender, the Supreme Court also
changed the plaintiff's gender no conformity.
The government's proposed approach to
Hively, which would compare a woman
attracted to people of the same sex with a man
attracted to people of the same sex, adopts the
wrong framing. To understand why this is
incorrect, consider the mismatch between the
facts in the government's comparison and the
allegation at issue: Hively did not allege that
her employer discriminated against women
with same-sex attraction but not men with
same-sex attraction. If she had, that would be
classic sex discrimination against a subset of
women. See Lead Dissent at 152 n.20.
Instead, Hively claimed that her employer
discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation. To address that allegation, the
proper question is whether sex is a
"motivating factor" in sexual orientation
discrimination, or, said more simply, whether
sexual orientation is a function of sex. But,
contrary to the government's suggestion, this
question cannot be answered by comparing
two people with the same sexual orientation.
That would be equivalent to comparing the
gender non-conforming female plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse to a gender nonconforming man; such a comparison would
not illustrate whether a particular stereotype
is sex dependent but only whether the
employer discriminates against gender nonconformity in only one gender. Instead, just
as Price Waterhouse compared a gender nonconforming woman to a gender conforming
man, both of whom were aggressive and did
not wear makeup or jewelry, the Hively court
properly determined that sexual orientation is
sex dependent by comparing a woman and a

We can also look to the Supreme Court's
decision in Price Waterhouse. Although that
case did not quote Manhart 's "but for"
language, it involved a similar inquiry: in
determining whether discrimination based on
particular traits was rooted in sex stereotypes,
the Supreme Court asked whether a female
accountant would have been denied a
promotion based on her aggressiveness and
failure to wear jewelry and makeup "if she
had been a man." Otherwise said, the
Supreme Court compared a man and a
woman who exhibited the plaintiff's traits and
asked whether they would have experienced
different employment outcomes. Notably,
being aggressive and not wearing jewelry or
makeup is consistent with gender stereotypes
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man with two different sexual orientations,
both of whom were attracted to women.

inquiry into whether sexual orientation
discrimination is "because of ... sex," and has
no bearing on the efficacy of the comparative
test.

The government further counters that the
comparative test produces false positives in
instances where it is permissible to impose
different terms of employment on men and
women because "the sexes are not similarly
situated." For example, the government
posits that courts have rejected the
comparative test when assessing employer
policies regarding sex-segregated bathrooms
and different grooming standards for men
and women. Similarly, the lead dissent insists
that our holding would preclude such policies
if "[t]aken to its logical conclusion." Both
criticisms are misplaced.

Having addressed the proper application of
the comparative test, we conclude that the
law is clear: To determine whether a trait
operates as a proxy for sex, we ask whether
the employee would have been treated
differently "but for" his or her sex. In the
context of sexual orientation, a woman who
is subject to an adverse employment action
because she is attracted to women would
have been treated differently if she had been
a man who was attracted to women. We can
therefore conclude that sexual orientation is a
function of sex and, by extension, sexual
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex
discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based
on sex in violation of Title VII must show
two things: (1) that he was "discriminate[d]
against ... with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," and (2) that the employer
discriminated "because of ... sex." The
comparative test addresses the second prong
of that test; it reveals whether an employment
practice is "because of ... sex" by asking
whether the trait at issue (life expectancy,
sexual orientation, etc.) is a function of sex.
In contrast, courts that have addressed
challenges to the sex-specific employment
practices identified by the government have
readily acknowledged that the policies are
based on sex and instead focused their
analysis on the first prong: whether the
policies impose "disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment." Whether sexspecific bathroom and grooming policies
impose disadvantageous terms or conditions
is a separate question from this Court's

2. Gender Stereotyping
Viewing the relationship between sexual
orientation and sex through the lens of gender
stereotyping provides yet another basis for
concluding
that
sexual
orientation
discrimination is a subset of sex
discrimination. Specifically, this framework
demonstrates that sexual orientation
discrimination is almost invariably rooted in
stereotypes about men and women.
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "employment decisions
cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped'
impressions about the characteristics of
males or females," because Title VII
"strike[s] at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes." This is true of stereotypes
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about both how the sexes are and how they
should be.

favorably if the employee were of a different
sex.

In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court
concluded that adverse employment actions
taken based on the belief that a female
accountant should walk, talk, and dress
femininely constituted impermissible sex
discrimination. Similarly, Manhart stands for
the proposition that "employment decisions
cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped'
impressions about the characteristics of
males or females," and held that female
employees could not, by virtue of their status
as women, be discriminated against based on
the gender stereotype that women generally
outlive men. Under these principles,
employees
who
experience
adverse
employment actions as a result of their
employer's generalizations about members of
their sex, or "as a result of their employer's
animus toward their exhibition of behavior
considered
to
be
stereotypically
inappropriate for their gender may have a
claim under Title VII[.]"

Applying Price Waterhouse 's reasoning to
sexual orientation, we conclude that when,
for example, "an employer ... acts on the basis
of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to
men], or that [they] must not be," but takes no
such action against women who are attracted
to men, the employer "has acted on the basis
of gender." This conclusion is consistent with
Hively 's holding that same-sex orientation
"represents the ultimate case of failure to
conform" to gender stereotypes, and aligns
with numerous district courts' observation
that "stereotypes about homosexuality are
directly related to our stereotypes about the
proper roles of men and women. ... The
gender stereotype at work here is that 'real'
men should date women, and not other men,"
This conclusion is further reinforced by the
unworkability of Simonton and Dawson 's
holding that sexual orientation discrimination
is not a product of sex stereotypes. Lower
courts operating under this standard have
long labored to distinguish between gender
stereotypes that support an inference of
impermissible sex discrimination and those
that are indicative of sexual orientation
discrimination. Under this approach "a
woman might have a Title VII claim if she
was harassed or fired for being perceived as
too 'macho' but not if she was harassed or
fired for being perceived as a lesbian." In
parsing the evidence, courts have resorted to
lexical bean counting, comparing the relative
frequency of epithets such as "ass wipe,"
"fag," "gay," "queer," "real man," and "fem"
to determine whether discrimination is based
on sex or sexual orientation. Claims of

Accepting that sex stereotyping violates Title
VII, the "crucial question" is "[w]hat
constitutes a gender-based stereotype." As
demonstrated by Price Waterhouse, one way
to answer this question is to ask whether the
employer who evaluated the plaintiff in "sexbased terms would have criticized her as
sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had
been a man." Similarly, this Court has
observed that the question of whether there
has been improper reliance on sex
stereotypes can sometimes be answered by
considering whether the behavior or trait at
issue would have been viewed more or less
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gender discrimination have been "especially
difficult for gay plaintiffs to bring," because
references to a plaintiff's sexual orientation
are generally excluded from the evidence,
Boutillier, or permitted only when "the
harassment consists of homophobic slurs
directed at a heterosexual[.]" Unsurprisingly,
many courts have found these distinctions
unworkable, admitting that the doctrine is
"illogical," and produces "untenable results,"
In the face of this pervasive confusion, we are
persuaded that "the line between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination is 'difficult to draw' because
that line does not exist save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct." We now conclude
that sexual orientation discrimination is
rooted in gender stereotypes and is thus a
subset of sex discrimination.

employer's belief, the longevity metric was
predicated on assumptions about sex. The
same can be said of sexual orientation
discrimination.
To be clear, our conclusion that moral beliefs
regarding sexual orientation are based on sex
does not presuppose that those beliefs are
necessarily animated by an invidious or evil
motive. For purposes of Title VII, any belief
that depends, even in part, on sex, is an
impermissible basis for employment
decisions. This is true irrespective of whether
the belief is grounded in fact, as in Manhart,
or lacks "a malevolent motive," Indeed, in
Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court
concluded that an employer violated Title VII
by excluding fertile women from jobs that
involved exposure to high levels of lead,
which can adversely affect the development
of a fetus. As the Court emphasized, "[t]he
beneficence of an employer's purpose does
not undermine the conclusion that an explicit
gender-based policy is sex discrimination"
under Title VII. Here, because sexual
orientation is a function of sex, beliefs about
sexual orientation, including moral ones, are,
in some measure, "because of ... sex." The
government responds that, even if
discrimination based on sexual orientation
reflects a sex stereotype, it is not barred by
Price Waterhouse because it treats women no
worse than men. We believe the government
has it backwards. Price Waterhouse, read in
conjunction with Oncale, stands for the
proposition that employers may not
discriminate against women or men who fail
to conform to conventional gender norms. It
follows that the employer in Price
Waterhouse could not have defended itself by
claiming that it fired a gender-non-

The government resists this conclusion,
insisting that negative views of those
attracted to members of the same sex may not
be based on views about gender at all, but
may be rooted in "moral beliefs about sexual,
marital and familial relationships." But this
argument merely begs the question by
assuming that moral beliefs about sexual
orientation can be dissociated from beliefs
about sex. Because sexual orientation is a
function of sex, this is simply impossible.
Beliefs about sexual orientation necessarily
take sex into consideration and, by extension,
moral beliefs about sexual orientation are
necessarily predicated, in some degree, on
sex. For this reason, it makes no difference
that the employer may not believe that its
actions are based in sex. In Manhart, for
example, the employer claimed its policy was
based on longevity, not sex, but the Supreme
Court concluded that, irrespective of the
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conforming man as well as a gender-nonconforming woman any more than it could
persuasively argue that two wrongs make a
right. To the contrary, this claim would
merely be an admission that the employer has
doubly violated Title VII by using gender
stereotypes to discriminate against both men
and women. By the same token, an employer
who discriminates against employees based
on assumptions about the gender to which the
employees can or should be attracted has
engaged in sex-discrimination irrespective of
whether the employer uses a double-edged
sword that cuts both men and women.

woman. This Court concluded that Holcomb
had stated a viable claim, holding that "an
employer may violate Title VII if it takes
action against an employee because of the
employee's association with a person of
another race." Although the Court considered
the argument that the alleged discrimination
was based on the race of Holcomb's wife
rather than his own, it ultimately concluded
that "where an employee is subjected to
adverse action because an employer
disapproves of interracial association, the
employee suffers discrimination because of
the employee's own race."

3. Associational Discrimination

Applying similar reasoning, the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits have reached the same
conclusion in racial discrimination cases.
Other circuits have indicated that
associational discrimination extends beyond
race to all of Title VII's protected classes. We
agree and we now hold that the prohibition on
associational discrimination applies with
equal force to all the classes protected by
Title VII, including sex.

The conclusion that sexual orientation
discrimination is a subset of sex
discrimination is further reinforced by
viewing this issue through the lens of
associational discrimination. Consistent with
the nature of sexual orientation, in most
contexts where an employer discriminates
based on sexual orientation, the employer's
decision is predicated on opposition to
romantic association between particular
sexes. For example, when an employer fires
a gay man based on the belief that men should
not be attracted to other men, the employer
discriminates based on the employee's own
sex.

This conclusion is consistent with the text of
Title VII, which "on its face treats each of the
enumerated categories exactly the same"
such that "principles ... announce[d]" with
respect to sex discrimination "apply with
equal force to discrimination based on race,
religion, or national origin," and vice versa. It
also accords with the Supreme Court's
application of theories of discrimination
developed in Title VII race discrimination
cases to claims involving discrimination
based on sex.

This Court recognized associational
discrimination as a violation of Title VII in
Holcomb v. Iona College, a case involving
allegations
of
racial
discrimination.
Holcomb, a white man, alleged that he was
fired from his job as the assistant coach of a
college basketball team because his employer
disapproved of his marriage to a black

As was observed in Christiansen, "[p]utting
aside romantic associations," the notion that
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employees should not be discriminated
against because of their association with
persons of a particular sex "is not
controversial." If an employer disapproves of
close friendships among persons of opposite
sexes and fires a female employee because
she has male friends, the employee has been
discriminated against because of her own sex.
"Once we accept this premise, it makes little
sense to carve out same-sex [romantic]
relationships as an association to which these
protections do not apply." Applying the
reasoning of Holcomb, if a male employee
married to a man is terminated because his
employer disapproves of same-sex marriage,
the employee has suffered associational
discrimination based on his own sex because
"the fact that the employee is a man instead
of a woman motivated the employer's
discrimination against him."

Although this conclusion can rest on its own
merits, it is reinforced by the reasoning of
Loving v. Virginia. In Loving , the
Commonwealth of Virginia argued that antimiscegenation statutes did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because such
statutes applied equally to white and black
citizens. The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that "equal application" could not
save the statute because it was based "upon
distinctions drawn according to race."
Constitutional cases like Loving "can provide
helpful guidance in [the] statutory context" of
Title VII. Accordingly, we find that Loving 's
insight—that policies that distinguish
according to protected characteristics cannot
be saved by equal application—extends to
association based on sex.
Certain amici supporting the defendants
disagree, arguing that applying Holcomb and
Loving to same-sex relationships is not
warranted
because
anti-miscegenation
policies are motivated by racism, while
sexual orientation discrimination is not
rooted in sexism. Although these amici offer
no empirical support for this contention,
amici supporting Zarda cite research
suggesting
that
sexual
orientation
discrimination has deep misogynistic roots.
But the Court need not resolve this dispute
because the amici supporting defendants
identify no cases indicating that the scope of
Title VII's protection against
sex
discrimination is limited to discrimination
motivated by what would colloquially be
described as sexism. To the contrary, this
approach is squarely foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's precedents. In Oncale, the
Court explicitly rejected the argument that
Title VII did not protect male employees

In this scenario, it is no defense that an
employer requires both men and women to
refrain from same-sex attraction or
relationships. In Holcomb, for example, the
white plaintiff was fired for his marriage to a
black woman. If the facts of Holcomb had
also involved a black employee fired for his
marriage to a white woman, would we have
said that because both the white employee
and black employee were fired for their
marriages to people of different races, there
was no discrimination "because of ... race"?
Of course not. It is unthinkable that "tak[ing]
action against an employee because of the
employee's association with a person of
another race," would be excused because two
employees of different races were both
victims of an anti- miscegenation workplace
policy. The same is true of discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
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from sexual harassment by male co-workers,
holding that "Title VII's prohibition on
discrimination 'because of ... sex' protects
men as well as women" and extends to
instances where the "plaintiff and the
defendant ... are of the same sex." This maleon-male harassment is well-outside the
bounds
of
what
is
traditionally
conceptualized as sexism. Similarly, as we
have discussed, in Manhart the Court
invalidated a pension scheme that required
female employees to contribute more than
their male counterparts because women
generally live longer than men. Again, the
Court
reached
this
conclusion
notwithstanding the fact that some people
might not describe this policy as sexist. By
extension, even if sexual orientation
discrimination does not evince conventional
notions of sexism, this is not a legitimate
basis for concluding that it does not constitute
discrimination "because of ... sex."

require student organizations to be open to all
students, a religious student organization
claimed that it should be permitted to exclude
anyone who engaged in "unrepentant
homosexual conduct," because such
individuals were being excluded "on the basis
of a conjunction of [their] conduct and [their]
belief that the conduct is not wrong," not
because of their sexual orientation. Drawing
on Lawrence and Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic , the Supreme Court
rejected the invitation to treat discrimination
based on acts as separate from discrimination
based on status. Although amici 's argument
inverts the previous defenses of policies
targeting individuals attracted to persons of
the same sex by arguing that Title VII's
prohibition of associational discrimination
protects only acts, not status, their proposed
distinction is equally unavailing. More
fundamentally, amici 's argument is an
inaccurate characterization of associational
discrimination. First, the source of the Title
VII claim is not the employee's associational
act but rather the employer's discrimination,
which is motivated by "disapprov[al] of [a
particular type of] association." In addition,
as it pertains to the employee, what is
protected is not the employee's act but rather
the employee's protected characteristic,
which is a status. Accordingly, associational
discrimination is not limited to acts; instead,
as with all other violations of Title VII,
associational discrimination runs afoul of the
statute by making the employee's protected
characteristic a motivating factor for an
adverse employment action.

The fallback position for those opposing the
associational framework is that associational
discrimination can be based only on acts—
such as Holcomb's act of getting married—
whereas sexual orientation is a status. As an
initial matter, the Supreme Court has rejected
arguments that would treat acts as separate
from status in the context of sexual
orientation. In Lawrence v. Texas, the state
argued that its "sodomy law [did] not
discriminate against homosexual persons,"
but "only against homosexual conduct."
Justice O'Connor refuted this argument,
reasoning that laws that target "homosexual
conduct" are "an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination."
More recently, in a First Amendment case
addressing whether a public university could

In sum, we see no principled basis for
recognizing a violation of Title VII for
associational discrimination based on race
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but not on sex. Accordingly, we hold that
sexual orientation discrimination, which is
based on an employer's opposition to
association between particular sexes and
thereby discriminates against an employee
based on their own sex, constitutes
discrimination "because of ... sex."
Therefore, it is no less repugnant to Title VII
than anti-miscegenation policies.

In advancing this argument, the government
attempts to analogize the 1991 amendment to
the Supreme Court's recent discussion of an
amendment to the Fair Housing Act ("FHA").
In Texas Department of Housing &
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc. , the Court considered whether
disparate-impact claims were cognizable
under the FHA by looking to, inter alia , a
1988 amendment to the statute. The Court
found it relevant that "all nine Courts of
Appeals to have addressed the question" by
1988 "had concluded [that] the [FHA]
encompassed disparate-impact claims."
When concluding that Congress had
implicitly ratified these holdings, the Court
considered (1) the amendment's legislative
history, which confirmed that "Congress was
aware of this unanimous precedent," and (2)
the fact that the precedent was directly
relevant to the amendment, which "included
three exemptions from liability that assume
the existence of disparate-impact claims[.]"

C. Subsequent Legislative Developments
Although the conclusion that sexual
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex
discrimination follows naturally from
existing Title VII doctrine, the amici
supporting the defendants place substantial
weight
on
subsequent
legislative
developments that they argue militate against
interpreting "because of ... sex" to include
sexual orientation discrimination. Having
carefully considered each of amici 's
arguments, we find them unpersuasive.
First, the government points to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, arguing that this
amendment to Title VII ratified judicial
decisions construing discrimination "because
of ... sex" as excluding sexual orientation
discrimination. Among other things, the 1991
amendment expressly "codif[ied] the
concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job
related' " as articulated in Griggs, and
rejected the Supreme Court's prior decision
on that topic in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. According to the government, this
amendment also implicitly ratified the
decisions of the four courts of appeals that
had, as of 1991, held that Title VII does not
bar discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

The statutory history of Title VII is markedly
different. When we look at the 1991
amendment, we see no indication in the
legislative history that Congress was aware
of the circuit precedents identified by the
government and, turning to the substance of
the amendment, we have no reason to believe
that the new provisions it enacted were in any
way premised on or made assumptions about
whether sexual orientation was protected by
Title VII. It is also noteworthy that, when the
statute was amended in 1991, only three of
the thirteen courts of appeals had considered
whether Title VII prohibited sexual
orientation discrimination. Mindful of this
important context, this is not an instance
where we can conclude that Congress was
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aware of, much less relied upon, the handful
of Title VII cases discussing sexual
orientation. Indeed, the inference suggested
by the government is particularly suspect
given that the text of the 1991 amendment
emphasized that it was "respond[ing] to
Supreme Court decisions by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination." For these reasons, we do not
consider the 1991 amendment to have ratified
the interpretation of Title VII as excluding
sexual orientation discrimination.

unaware of or indifferent to the status quo, or
it may be unable "to agree upon how to alter
the status quo." These concerns ring true
here. We do not know why Congress did not
act and we are thus unable to choose among
the various inferences that could be drawn
from Congress's inaction on the bills
identified by the government. Accordingly,
we decline to assign congressional silence a
meaning it will not bear.
Drawing on the dissent in Hively, the
government also argues that Congress
considers sexual orientation discrimination to
be distinct from sex discrimination because it
has expressly prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination in certain statutes but not Title
VII. While it is true that Congress has
sometimes used the terms "sex" and "sexual
orientation" separately, this observation is
entitled to minimal weight in the context of
Title VII.

Next, certain amici argue that by not enacting
legislation expressly prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace
Congress has implicitly ratified decisions
holding that sexual orientation was not
covered by Title VII. According to the
government's amicus brief, almost every
Congress since 1974 has considered such
legislation but none of these bills became
law.

The presumptions that terms are used
consistently and that differences in
terminology denote differences in meaning
have the greatest force when the terms are
used in "the same act." By contrast, when
drafting separate statutes, Congress is far less
likely to use terms consistently, and these
presumptions are entitled to less force where,
as here, the government points to terms used
in different statutes passed by different
Congresses in different decades. Moreover,
insofar as the government argues that
mention of "sexual orientation" elsewhere in
the U.S. Code is evidence that "because of ...
sex" should not be interpreted to include
"sexual orientation," our race discrimination
jurisprudence demonstrates that this is not
dispositive. We have held that Title VII's

This theory of ratification by silence is in
direct tension with the Supreme Court's
admonition that "subsequent legislative
history is a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier Congress," particularly
when "it concerns, as it does here, a proposal
that does not become law." This is because
"[i]t is impossible to assert with any degree
of assurance that congressional failure to act
represents
affirmative
congressional
approval of [a particular] statutory
interpretation." After all, "[t]here are many
reasons Congress might not act on a decision
..., and most of them have nothing at all to do
with Congress' desire to preserve the
decision." For example, Congress may be
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prohibition
on
race
discrimination
encompasses discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity, notwithstanding the fact that other
federal statutes now enumerate race and
ethnicity separately. The same can be said of
sex and sexual orientation because
discrimination based on the former
encompasses the latter.

to the sex of those to whom one is attracted,
making it impossible for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation without taking sex into account.
Sexual orientation discrimination is also
based on assumptions or stereotypes about
how members of a particular gender should
be, including to whom they should be
attracted. Finally, sexual orientation
discrimination is associational discrimination
because an adverse employment action that is
motivated by the employer's opposition to
association between members of particular
sexes discriminates against an employee on
the basis of sex. Each of these three
perspectives is sufficient to support this
Court's conclusion and together they amply
demonstrate
that
sexual
orientation
discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination.

In sum, nothing in the subsequent legislative
history identified by the amici calls into
question our conclusion that sexual
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex
discrimination and is thereby barred by Title
VII.
III.

SUMMARY

Since 1964, the legal framework for
evaluating Title VII claims has evolved
substantially. Under Manhart, traits that
operate as a proxy for sex are an
impermissible basis for disparate treatment of
men and women. Under Price Waterhouse,
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes
is prohibited. Under Holcomb, building on
Loving, it is unlawful to discriminate on the
basis of an employee's association with
persons of another race. Applying these
precedents
to
sexual
orientation
discrimination, it is clear that there is "no
justification in the statutory language ... for a
categorical rule excluding" such claims from
the reach of Title VII.

Although sexual orientation discrimination is
"assuredly not the principal evil that
Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII," "statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils." In the context
of Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends
to all discrimination "because of ... sex" and
sexual orientation discrimination is an
actionable subset of sex discrimination. We
overturn our prior precedents to the contrary
to the extent they conflict with this ruling.
***

Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination
applies to any practice in which sex is a
motivating factor. As explained above,
sexual orientation discrimination is a subset
of sex discrimination because sexual
orientation is defined by one's sex in relation

Zarda has alleged that, by "honestly
referr[ing] to his sexual orientation," he failed
to "conform to the straight male macho
stereotype." For this reason, he has alleged a
claim of discrimination of the kind we now
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hold cognizable under Title VII. The district
court held that there was sufficient evidence
of sexual orientation discrimination to
survive summary judgment on Zarda's state
law claims. Even though Zarda lost his state
sexual orientation discrimination claim at

Supreme Court law and our own precedents
on race discrimination militate in favor of the
conclusion that sex discrimination based on
one's choice of partner is an impermissible
basis for discrimination under Title VII. This
view is an extension of existing law, perhaps
a cantilever, but not a leap.

trial, that result does not preclude him from
prevailing on his federal claim because his state
law claim was tried under "a higher standard of
causation than required by Title VII." Thus, we
hold that Zarda is entitled to bring a Title VII
claim for discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

First: this Circuit has already recognized
associational discrimination as a Title VII
violation. In Holcomb v. Iona Coll., we
considered a claim of discrimination under
Title VII by a white man who alleged that he
was fired because of his marriage to a black
woman. We held that "an employer may
violate Title VII if it takes action against an
employee because of the employee's
association with a person of another race . .
. The reason is simple: where an employee is
subjected to adverse action because an
employer
disapproves
of
interracial
association,
the
employee
suffers
discrimination
because
of
the
employee's own race."

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we VACATE the district
court's judgment on the Title VII claim and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court in all other respects.

JACOBS, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I concur in Parts I and II.B.3 of the opinion of
the Court (Associational Discrimination) and
I therefore concur in the result. Mr. Zarda
does have a sex discrimination claim under
Title VII based on the allegation that he was
fired because he was a man who had an
intimate relationship with another man. I
write separately because, of the several
justifications advanced in that opinion, I am
persuaded by one; and as to associational
discrimination, the opinion of the Court says
somewhat more than is necessary to justify it.
Since a single justification is sufficient to
support the result, I start with associational
discrimination, and very briefly explain
thereafter why the other grounds leave me
unconvinced.

Second: the analogy to same-sex
relationships is valid because Title VII "on its
face treats each of the enumerated categories
exactly the same"; thus principles announced
in regard to sex discrimination "apply with
equal force to discrimination based on race,
religion, or national origin." And,
presumably, vice versa.
Third: There is no reason I can see why
associational discrimination based on sex
would not encompass association between
persons of the same sex. In Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., a case in
which a man alleged same-sex harassment,
the Supreme Court stated that Title VII

I
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prohibits "'discriminat[ion] . . . because of . .
. sex'" and that Title VII "protects men as well
as women."

animus against men or against women. But it
cannot be that the protections of Title VII
depend on particular races; there are a lot
more than two races, and Title VII likewise
protects persons who are multiracial. Mr.
Mortara may identify analytical differences;
but to persons who experience the racial
discrimination, it is all one.

This line of cases, taken together,
demonstrates that discrimination based on
same-sex relationships is discrimination
cognizable under Title VII notwithstanding
that the sexual relationship is homosexual.

Mr. Mortara also argues that discrimination
based on homosexual acts and relationships
is analytically distinct from discrimination
against homosexuals, who have a proclivity
on which they may or may not act.
Academics may seek to know whether
discrimination is illegal if based on same-sex
attraction itself: they have jurisdiction over
interesting questions, and we do not. But the
distinction is not decisive. In any event, the
distinction between act and attraction does
not arise in this case because Mr. Zarda's
termination was sparked by his avowal of a
same-sex relationship.

Zarda's complaint can be fairly read to allege
discrimination based on his relationship with
a person of the same sex. The allegation is
analogous to the claim in Holcomb, in which
a person of one race was discriminated
against on the basis of race because he
consorted with a person of a different race. In
each instance, the basis for discrimination is
disapproval and prejudice as to who is
permitted to consort with whom, and the
common feature is the sorting: one is the
mixing of race and the other is the matching
of sex.
This outcome is easy to analogize to Loving
v. Virginia. While Loving was an Equal
Protection
challenge
to
Virginia's
miscegenation law, the law was held
unconstitutional because it impermissibly
drew distinctions according to race. In the
context of a person consorting with a person
of the same sex, the distinction is similarly
drawn according to sex, and is therefore
unlawful under Title VII.

A ruling based on Mr. Zarda's same-sex
relationship resolves this appeal; good craft
counsels that we go no further. Much of the
rest of the Court's opinion amounts to woke
dicta.
II
The opinion of the Court characterizes its
definitional analysis as "the most natural
reading of Title VII." Not really. "Sex,"
which is used in series with "race" and
"religion," is one of the words least likely to
fluctuate in meaning. I do not think I am
breaking new ground in saying that the word
"sex" as a personal characteristic refers to the
male and female of the species. Nor can there

Amicus Mortara argues that race
discrimination aroused by couples of
different race is premised on animus against
one of the races (based on the idea of white
supremacy), and that discrimination against
homosexuals is obviously not driven by
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be doubt that, when Title VII was drafted in
1964, "sex" drew the distinction between
men and women. "A fundamental canon of
statutory construction is that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted
as taking their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning."

analysis. But when the comparator test is
used for textual interpretation, it carries in
train ramifications that are sweeping and
unpredictable: think fitness tests for different
characteristics of men and women, not to
mention restrooms.
IV

In the opinion of the Court, the word "sex"
undergoes modification and expansion. Thus
the opinion reasons: "[l]ogically, because
sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex
is a protected characteristic under Title VII, it
follows that sexual orientation is also
protected." It is undeniable that sexual
orientation is a "function of sex" in the
(unhelpful) sense that it cannot be defined or
understood without reference to sex. But
surely that is because it has to do with sex-as so many things do. Everything that cannot
be understood without reference to sex does
not amount to sex itself as a term in Title VII.
So it seems to me that all of these arguments
are circular as well as unnecessary.

The opinion of the Court relies on the line of
cases that bars discrimination based on
sexual stereotype: the manifestation of it or
the failure to conform to it. There are at least
three reasons I am unpersuaded.
Anti-discrimination law should be explicable
in terms of evident fairness and justice,
whereas the analysis employed in the opinion
of the Court is certain to be baffling to the
populace.
The Opinion posits that heterosexuality is
just another sexual convention, bias, or
stereotype--like pants and skirts, or hairdos.
This is the most arresting notion in the
opinion of the Court. Stereotypes are
generalizations that are usually unfair or
defective.
Heterosexuality
and
homosexuality are both traits that are innate
and true, not stereotypes of anything else.

III
The opinion of the Court relies in part on a
comparator test, asking whether the
employee would have been treated
differently "but for" the employee's sex. But
the comparator test is an evidentiary
technique, not a tool for textual
interpretation. "[T]he ultimate issue" for a
court to decide in a Title VII case "is the
reason for the individual plaintiff's treatment,
not the relative treatment of different groups
within the workplace." The opinion of the
Court builds on the concept of homosexuality
as a subset of sex, and this analysis thus
merges in a fuzzy way with the definitional

If this case did involve discrimination on the
basis of sexual stereotype, it would have been
remanded to the District Court on that basis,
as was done in Christiansen v. Omnicom
Grp., Inc. The reason it could not be
remanded on that basis is that the record does
not associate Mr. Zarda with any sexual
stereotyping. The case arises from his verbal
disclosure of his sexual orientation during his
employment as a skydiving instructor, and
that is virtually all we know about him. It
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should not be surprising that a person of any
particular sexual orientation would earn a
living jumping out of airplanes; but Mr.
Zarda cannot fairly be described as evoking
somebody's sexual stereotype of homosexual
men. So this case does not present the
(settled) issue of sexual stereotype, which I
think is the very reason we had to go in banc
in order to decide this case. As was made
clear as recently as March 2017, "being gay,
lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not
constitute nonconformity with a gender
stereotype that can give rise to a cognizable
gender stereotyping claim."

We decide this appeal in the context of
something of a revolution in American law
respecting gender and sex. It appears to
reflect, inter alia, many Americans' evolving
regard for and social acceptance of gay and
lesbian persons. We are now called upon to
address questions dealing directly with sex,
sexual behavior, and sexual taboos, a
discussion fraught with moral, religious,
political, psychological, and other highly
charged issues. For those reasons (among
others), I think it is in the best interests of us
all to tread carefully; to say no more than we
must; to decide no more than is necessary to
resolve this appeal. This is not for fear of
offending, but for fear of the possible
consequences of being mistaken in one
unnecessary aspect or another of our
decision.

CABRANES, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. It
will take the courts years to sort out how each
of the theories presented by the majority
applies to other Title VII protected classes:
"race, color, religion, . . . [and] national
origin."

In my view, the law of this Circuit governing
what is referred to in the majority opinion as
"associational
discrimination"
—
discrimination against a person because of
his or her association with another — is
unsettled. What was embraced by this Court
in Simonton v. Runyon, seems to have both
been overtaken by, and to be inconsistent
with, our later panel decision in Holcomb v.
Iona College. Choosing between the two
approaches, as I think we must, I agree with
the majority that Holcomb is right and
that Simonton is therefore wrong. It is
principally on that basis that I concur in the
judgment of the Court.

This is a straightforward case of statutory
construction. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits discrimination "because of
. . . sex." Zarda's sexual orientation is a
function of his sex. Discrimination against
Zarda because of his sexual orientation
therefore is discrimination because of his
sex, and is prohibited by Title VII.
That should be the end of the analysis
SACK, Circuit Judge, concurring in the
judgment, and in parts I (Jurisdiction), II.A
(The Scope of Title VII), II:B.3
(Associational Discrimination), and II:C
(Subsequent Legislative Developments) of
the opinion for the Court:

My declination to join other parts of the
majority opinion does not signal my
disagreement with them. Rather, inasmuch
as, in my view, this appeal can be decided on
the simpler and less fraught theory of
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associational discrimination, I think it best to
stop there without then considering other
possible bases for our judgment.

majority opinion points out, cabining the
words in this way makes little or no sense of
Oncale or, for that matter, Price Waterhouse.
Second, their hunt for the "contemporary"
"public" meaning of the statute in this case
seems to me little more than a roundabout
search for legislative history. Judge Lynch's
laudable call (either as a way to divine
congressional intent or as an interpretive
check on the plain text approach) to consider
what the legislature would have decided if the
issue had occurred to the legislators at the
time of enactment is, unfortunately, no longer
an interpretive option of first resort. Time and
time again, the Supreme Court has told us
that the cart of legislative history is pulled by
the plain text, not the other way around. The
text here pulls in one direction, namely, that
sex includes sexual orientation.

LOHIER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I agree with the majority opinion that there is
no reasonable way to disentangle sex from
sexual orientation in interpreting the plain
meaning of the words "because of . . . sex."
The first term clearly subsumes the second,
just as race subsumes ethnicity. From this
central holding, the majority opinion
explores the comparative approach, the
stereotyping rationale, and the associational
discrimination rationale to help determine
"when a trait other than sex is . . . a proxy for
(or function of) sex." But in my view, these
rationales merely reflect nonexclusive
"evidentiary technique[s]," frameworks, or
ways to determine whether sex is a
motivating factor in a given case, rather than
interpretive tools that apply necessarily
across all Title VII cases. Zarda himself has
described these three rationales as
"evidentiary theories" or "routes." On this
understanding, I join the majority opinion as
to Parts II.A and II.B.1.a, which reflect the
textualist's approach, and join the remaining
parts of the opinion only insofar as they can
be said to apply to Zarda's particular case.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge, dissent:
Speaking solely as a citizen, I would be
delighted to awake one morning and learn
that Congress had just passed legislation
adding sexual orientation to the list of
grounds of employment discrimination
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. I am confident that one day —
and I hope that day comes soon — I will have
that pleasure.

A word about the dissents. My dissenting
colleagues focus on what they variously
describe as the "ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning" of the words "because of
. . . sex," the "public meaning of [those]
words adopted by Congress in light of the
social problem it was addressing when it
chose those words." There are at least two
problems with this position. First, as the

I would be equally pleased to awake to learn
that Congress had secretly passed such
legislation more than a half century ago —
until I actually woke up and realized that I
must have been still asleep and dreaming.
Because we all know that Congress did no
such thing.
I
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Of course, today's majority does not contend
that Congress literally prohibited sexual
orientation discrimination in 1964. It is worth
remembering the historical context of that
time to understand why any such contention
would be indefensible.

summer of 1963, the assassination of
President Kennedy in November of that year,
and President Johnson's strong support for a
civil rights bill that prohibited racial
discrimination in employment, that the
legislation made progress in Congress. But
the private employment discrimination
provision, like other sections of the bill
prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations and federally funded
programs, was openly and bitterly opposed
by a large contingent of southern members of
Congress. Its passage was by no means
assured when the floor debates in the House
began.

The Civil Rights Act as a whole was
primarily a product of the movement for
equality for African-Americans. It grew out
of the demands of that movement, and was
opposed by segregationist white members of
Congress who opposed racial equality.
Although the bill, even before it included a
prohibition against sex discrimination, went
beyond race to prohibit discrimination based
on religion and national origin, there is no
question that it would not have been under
consideration at all but for the national effort
to reckon to some degree with America's
heritage of race-based slavery and
government-enforced segregation.

From the moment President Kennedy
proposed the Civil Rights Act in 1963,
women's rights groups, with the support of
some members of Congress, had urged that
sex discrimination be included as a target of
the legislation. The movements in the United
States for gender and racial equality have not
always marched in tandem — although there
was some overlap between abolitionists and
supporters of women's suffrage, suffragists
often relied on the racially offensive
argument that it was outrageous that white
women could not vote when black men
could. But by the 1960s, many feminist
advocates consciously adopted arguments
parallel to those of the civil rights movement,
and there was growing recognition that the
two causes were linked in fundamental ways.

It is perhaps difficult for people not then alive
to understand that before the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 became law, an employer could post
a sign saying "Help Wanted; No Negroes
Need Apply" without violating any federal
law — and many employers did. Even the
original House bill, introduced with the
support
of
President
Kennedy's
Administration in 1963, did not prohibit
racial discrimination by private employers.
Language
prohibiting
employment
discrimination by private employers on the
grounds of "race, color, religion or national
origin" was added later by a House
subcommittee.

Women's rights groups had been arguing for
laws prohibiting sex discrimination since at
least World War II, and had been gaining
recognition for the agenda of the women's
rights movement in other arenas. In addition
to supporting (at least rhetorically) civil

Movement on the bill was slow. It was only
after the March on Washington in the
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rights for African-Americans, President
Kennedy had taken tentative steps towards
support of women's rights as well. In
December 1961, he created the President's
Commission on the Status of Women,
chaired until her death by Eleanor Roosevelt.
Among other goals, the Commission was
charged with developing recommendations
for "overcoming discriminations in . . .
employment on the basis of sex," and
suggesting "services which will enable
women to continue their role []as wives and
mothers while making a maximum
contribution to the world around them."

controversial. By 1964, only two states,
Hawaii and Wisconsin, prohibited sex
discrimination in employment. Although
decades had passed since the Supreme Court
announced in Muller v. Oregon, that laws
limiting the hours that women could work did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather were an appropriate accommodation
for women's fragile constitutions and more
pressing maternal obligations, state laws
"protecting" women from the rigors of the
workplace remained commonplace.
Accordingly, when Representative Howard
W. Smith of Virginia, a diehard opponent of
integration and federal legislation to enforce
civil rights for African-Americans, proposed
that "sex" be added to the prohibited grounds
of discrimination in the Civil Rights Act,
there was reason to suspect that his
amendment was an intentional effort to
render the Act so divisive and controversial
that it would be impossible to pass. That
might not have been the case, however. Like
those early suffragettes who were ambivalent
about, or hostile to, racial equality, Smith
also had a prior history of support for
(presumably white) women's equality. For
example, he had been a longstanding
supporter of a constitutional amendment
guaranteeing equal rights to women.

The Commission's report highlighted the
increasing role of women in the workplace,
noting (in an era when the primacy of
women's role in child-rearing and homemaking was taken for granted) that even
women with children generally spent no
more than a decade or so of their lives
engaged in full-time child care, allowing a
significant portion of women's lives to be
dedicated to education and employment.
Accordingly, the Commission advocated a
variety of steps to improve women's
economic
position.
While
those
recommendations did not include federal
legislation
prohibiting
employment
discrimination on the basis of sex, they did
include a commitment to equal opportunity in
employment by federal contractors and
proposed such equality as a goal for private
employers — as well as proposing other
innovations, such as paid maternity leave and
universal high-quality public child care, that
have yet to become the law of the land.

Whatever Smith's subjective motivations for
proposing it, the amendment was adamantly
opposed by many northern liberals on the
ground that it would undermine support for
the Act as a whole. Indeed, the New York
Times ridiculed the amendment, suggesting
that, among other alleged absurdities, it
would require Radio City Music Hall to hire
male Rockettes, and concluding that "it

Nevertheless, the notion that women should
be treated equally at work remained
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would have been better if Congress had just
abolished sex itself."

was not until two years later, in 1975, that the
American
Psychological
Association
followed suit and "adopted the same position
[as the American Psychiatric Association],
urging all mental health professionals to
work to dispel the stigma of mental illness
long
associated
with
homosexual
orientation." Because gay identity was
viewed as a mental illness and was, in effect,
defined by participation in a criminal act, the
employment situation for openly gay
Americans was bleak.

But despite its contested origins, the adoption
of the amendment prohibiting sex
discrimination was not an accident or a stunt.
Once the amendment was on the floor, it was
aggressively championed by a coalition
comprising most of the (few) women
members of the House. Its subsequent
adoption was consistent with a long history
of women's rights advocacy that had
increasingly been gaining mainstream
recognition and acceptance.

Consider the rules regarding employment by
the federal government. Starting in the 1940s
and continuing through the 1960s, thanks to
a series of executive orders repealing longstanding discriminatory policies, federal
employment opportunities for AfricanAmericans began to open up significantly. In
sharp contrast, in 1953 President Eisenhower
signed an executive order excluding persons
guilty of "sexual perversion" from
government employment. During the same
period, gay federal employees, or employees
even suspected of being gay, were
systematically hounded out of the service as
"security risks" during Cold-War witchhunts.

Discrimination against gay women and men,
by contrast, was not on the table for public
debate. In those dark, pre-Stonewall days,
same-sex sexual relations were criminalized
in nearly all states. Only three years before
the passage of Title VII, Illinois, under the
influence of the American Law Institute's
proposed Model Penal Code, had become the
first state to repeal laws prohibiting private
consensual adult relations between members
of the same sex.
In addition to criminalization, gay men and
women were stigmatized as suffering from
mental illness. In 1964, both the American
Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological
Association
regrettably
classified homosexuality as a mental illness
or disorder. As the Supreme Court recently
explained, "[f]or much of the 20th century . .
. homosexuality was treated as an illness.
When the American Psychiatric Association
published the first Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952,
homosexuality was classified as a mental
disorder, a position adhered to until 1973." It

Civil rights and civil liberties organizations
were largely silent. In an influential book
about the political plight of gay people,
Edward Sagarin, writing under the
pseudonym Donald Webster Cory, sharply
criticized the silence of the bar. For instance,
he described the response to the abusive
tactics used against members of the military
discharged for homosexual conduct as
follows: "And who raises a voice in protest
against such discrimination? No one. Where
was the American Civil Liberties Union?
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Nowhere." To the extent that civil rights
organizations did begin to engage with gay
rights during the early 1960s, they did so
through the lens of sexual liberty, rather than
equality, grouping the prohibition of laws
against same-sex relations with prohibitions
of birth control, abortion, and adultery. Even
by the mid-1960s, the ACLU was identified
by Newsweek as the only group "apart from
the homophile organizations" that opposed
laws criminalizing homosexual acts.

decade after the Civil Rights Act had become
law. It was not until 1982 that Wisconsin
became the first state to ban both public and
private sector discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Notably, as discussed more fully
below, these states did so by explicit
legislative action adding "sexual orientation"
to pre-existing anti-discrimination laws that
already prohibited discrimination based on
sex; they did not purport to "recognize" that
sexual orientation discrimination was merely
an
aspect
of
already-prohibited
discrimination based on sex.

Given the criminalization of same-sex
relationships and arbitrary and abusive police
harassment of gay and lesbian citizens,
nascent gay rights organizations had more
urgent concerns than private employment
discrimination. As late as 1968, four
years after the passage of Title VII, the North
American Conference of Homophile
Organizations proposed a "Homosexual Bill
of Rights" that demanded five fundamental
rights: that private consensual sex
between adults not be a crime; that
solicitation of sex acts not be prosecuted
except on a complaint by someone other than
an undercover officer; that sexual orientation
not be a factor in granting security clearances,
visas, or citizenship; that homosexuality not
be a barrier to service in the military; and that
sexual orientation not affect eligibility for
employment with federal, state, or local
governments. Those proposals, which
pointedly did not include a ban on private
sector employment discrimination against
gays, evidently had little traction with many
Americans at the time. The first state to
prohibit employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation even in the public
sector was Pennsylvania, by executive order
of the governor, in 1975 — more than a

In light of that history, it is perhaps needless
to say that there was no discussion of sexual
orientation discrimination in the debates on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. If some
sexist legislators considered the inclusion of
sex discrimination in the bill something of a
joke, or perhaps a poison pill to make civil
rights legislation even more controversial,
evidently no one thought that adding sexual
orientation to the list of forbidden categories
was worth using even in that way. Nor did
those who opposed the sex provision in Title
VII include the possibility that prohibiting
sex discrimination would also prevent sexual
orientation discrimination in their parade of
supposed horribles. When Representative
Emanuel Celler of New York, floor manager
for the Civil Rights Bill in the House, rose to
oppose Representative Smith's proposed
amendment, he expressed concern that it
would lead to such supposed travesties as the
elimination of "protective" employment laws
regulating working conditions for women,
drafting women for military service, and
revisions of rape and alimony laws. He did
not reference the prohibition of sexual
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orientation discrimination. The idea was
nowhere on the horizon.

prohibit discrimination against
because of their sexual orientation.

people

II

A

I do not cite this sorry history of opposition
to equality for African-Americans, women,
and gay women and men, and of the biases
prevailing a half-century ago, to argue that
the private intentions and motivations of the
members of Congress can trump the plain
language or clear implications of a legislative
enactment. (Still less, of course, do I endorse
the views of those who opposed racial
equality, ridiculed women's rights, and
persecuted people for their sexual
orientation.)
Although
Chief
Judge
Katzmann has observed elsewhere that
judicial warnings about relying on legislative
history as an interpretive aid have been
overstated, I agree with him, and with my
other colleagues in the majority, that the
implications of legislation flatly prohibiting
sex discrimination in employment, duly
enacted by Congress and signed by the
President, cannot be cabined by citing the
private prejudices or blind spots of those
members of Congress who voted for it. The
above history makes it obvious to me,
however, that the majority misconceives the
fundamental public meaning of the language
of the Civil Rights Act. The problem sought
to be remedied by adding "sex" to the
prohibited
bases
of
employment
discrimination
was
the
pervasive
discrimination against women in the
employment market, and the chosen remedy
was to prohibit discrimination that adversely
affected members of one sex or the other. By
prohibiting discrimination against people
based on their sex, it did not, and does not,

To start, the history of the overlapping
movements for equality for blacks, women,
and gays, and the differing pace of their
progress, as outlined in the previous section,
tells us something important about what the
language of Title VII must have meant to any
reasonable member of Congress, and indeed
to any literate American, when it was passed
— what Judge Sykes has called the "original
public meaning" of the statute. That history
tells us a great deal about why the legislators
who constructed and voted for the Act used
the specific language that they did.
The words used in legislation are used for a
reason. Legislation is adopted in response to
perceived social problems, and legislators
adopt the language that they do to address a
social evil or accomplish a desirable goal.
The words of the statute take meaning from
that purpose, and the principles it adopts must
be read in light of the problem it was enacted
to address. The words may indeed cut deeper
than the legislators who voted for the statute
fully understood or intended: as relevant
here, a law aimed at producing gender
equality in the workplace may require or
prohibit employment practices that the
legislators who voted for it did not yet
understand as obstacles to gender equality.
Nevertheless, it remains a law aimed at
gender inequality, and not at other forms of
discrimination that were understood at the
time, and continue to be understood, as a
different kind of prejudice, shared not only
by some of those who opposed the rights of
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women and African-Americans, but also by
some who believed in equal rights for women
and people of color.

clear, and it is particularly emphatic in the
workplace.
That history makes it equally clear that the
prohibition of discrimination "based on sex"
was intended to secure the rights of women
to equal protection in employment. Put
simply, the addition of "sex" to a bill to
prohibit employers from "discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his [or
her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, . . . or
national origin," was intended to eliminate
workplace inequalities that held women back
from advancing in the economy, just as the
original bill aimed to protect AfricanAmericans and other racial, national, and
religious
minorities
from
similar
discrimination. The language of the Act itself
would have been so understood not only by
members of Congress, but by any politically
engaged citizen deciding whether to urge his
or her representatives to vote for it. As Judge
Sykes noted in her dissent in the Seventh
Circuit's encounter with the same issue we
face today, citing a 1960s dictionary, "In
common, ordinary usage in 1964 — and now,
for that matter — the word 'sex' means
biologically male or female; it does not also
refer to sexual orientation." On the verge of
the adoption of historic legislation to address
bigotry against African-Americans on the
basis of race, women in effect stood up and
said "us, too," and Congress agreed.

The history I have cited is not "legislative
history" narrowly conceived. It cannot be
disparaged as a matter of attempts by
legislators or their aides to influence future
judicial interpretation — in the direction of
results they could not convince a majority to
support in the overt language of a statute —
by announcing to largely empty chambers, or
inserting into obscure corners of committee
reports, explanations of the intended or
unintended legal implications of a bill. Nor
am I seeking to infer the unexpressed wishes
of all or a majority of the hundreds of
legislators who voted for a bill without
addressing a particular question of
interpretation. Rather, I am concerned with
what principles Congress committed the
country to by enacting the words it chose. I
contend that these principles can be
illuminated by an understanding of the
central public meaning of the language used
in the statute at the time of its enactment.
If the specifically legislative history of the
"sex amendment" is relatively sparse in light
of its adoption as a floor amendment, the
broader political and social history of the
prohibition of sex discrimination in
employment is plain for all to read. The
history of the 20th century is, among other
things, a history of increasing equality of men
and women. Recent events remind us of how
spotty that equality remains, and how
inequality persists even with respect to the
basic right of women to physical security and
control of their own bodies. But the trend is

The majority cites judicial interpretations of
Title VII as prohibiting sexual harassment,
and allowing hostile work environment
claims, in an effort to argue that the
expansion they are making simply follows in
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this line. But the fact that a prohibition on
discrimination against members of one sex
may have unanticipated consequences when
courts are asked to consider carefully
whether a given practice does, in fact,
discriminate against members of one sex in
the workplace does not support extending
Title VII by judicial construction to protect
an entirely different category of people. It is
true that what counts as discrimination
against members of one sex may not have
been fully fleshed out in the minds of
supporters of the legislation, but it is easy
enough to illustrate how the language of a
provision enacted to accomplish the goal of
equal treatment of the sexes compels results
that may not have been specifically intended
by its enacters.

religions, and sexes that is important, even if
the primary intended beneficiaries of the
legislation — those most in need of its
protection — are members of the races,
religions, and gender that have suffered the
most from inequality in the past.
Other interpretations of the statute that may
not have occurred to members of the
overwhelmingly male Congress that adopted
it seem equally straightforward. Perhaps it
did not occur to some of those male members
of Congress that sexual harassment of
women in the workplace was a form of
employment discrimination, or that Title VII
was inconsistent with a "Mad Men" culture in
the office. But although a few judges were
slow to recognize this point, as soon as the
issue began to arise in litigation, courts
quickly recognized that for an employer to
expect members of one sex to provide sexual
favors as a condition of employment from
which members of the other sex are exempt,
or to view the only value of female
employees as stemming from their
sexualization, constitutes a fundamental type
of discrimination in conditions of
employment based on sex.

To begin with, just as laws prohibiting racial
discrimination, adopted principally to
address some of the festering national wrongs
done to African-Americans, protect members
of all races, including then-majority white
European-Americans, the prohibition of sex
discrimination by its plain language protects
men as well as women, whether or not
anyone who voted on the bill specifically
considered whether and under what
circumstances men could be victims of
gender-based discrimination. That is not an
expansion of Title VII, but is a conclusion
mandated by its text: Congress deliberately
chose to protect women and minorities not by
prohibiting discrimination against "AfricanAmericans" or "Jews" or "women," but by
neutrally prohibiting discrimination against
any individual "based on race, . . . religion,
[or] sex." That choice of words is clearly
intentional, and represents a commitment to a
principle of equal treatment of races,

The reason why any argument to the contrary
would fail is not a matter of simplistic
application of a formal standard, along the
lines of "well, the employer wouldn't have
asked the same of a man, so it's sex
discrimination." Sexual exploitation has been
a principal obstacle to the equal participation
of women in the workplace, and whether or
not individual legislators intended to prohibit
it when they cast their votes for
Representative Smith's amendment, both the
literal language of that amendment and the
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elimination of the social evil at which it was
aimed make clear that the statute must be read
to prohibit it.

classifications unrelated to job performance."
Title VII does not adopt a broad principle of
equal protection in the workplace; rather, its
language singles out for prohibition
discrimination based on particular categories
and classifications that have been used to
perpetuate injustice — but not all such
categories and classifications. That is not a
matter of abstract justice, but of political
reality. Those groups that had succeeded by
1964 in persuading a majority of the
members of Congress that unfair treatment of
them ought to be prohibited were included;
those who had not yet achieved that political
objective were not.

The same goes for other forms of "hostile
environment" discrimination. The history of
resistance to racial integration illustrates
why. Employers forced to take down their
"whites only" signs could not be permitted to
retreat to the position that "you can make me
hire black workers, but you can't make me
welcome them." Making black employees
so unwelcome that they would be deterred
from seeking or retaining jobs previously
reserved for whites must be treated as an
instance of prohibited racial discrimination
— and the same clearly goes for sex
discrimination.
The
Supreme
Court
recognized that point, in exactly those terms:

Thus, if Representative Smith's amendment
had been defeated, Title VII would still be a
landmark prohibition of the kinds of race-,
religion-,
and
national
origin-based
employment discrimination that had
historically disadvantaged blacks, Jews,
Catholics, or Mexican-Americans. But it
would not have protected women, and a
subsequent shift in popular support for such
protection would not have changed that fact,
without legislative action. Similarly, the
statute did not protect those discriminated
against, similarly unfairly, on the basis of age
or disability; that required later legislation.

The phrase "terms, conditions or
privileges of employment" in Title
VII is an expansive concept which
sweeps within its protective ambit the
practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged with
ethnic or racial discrimination. . . .
Nothing in Title VII suggests that a
hostile environment based on
discriminatory sexual harassment
should not be likewise prohibited.

None of this, of course, is remotely to suggest
that employment discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is somehow not
invidious and wrong. But not everything that
is offensive or immoral or economically
inefficient is illegal, and if the view that a
practice is offensive or immoral or
economically inefficient does not command
sufficiently broad and deep political support
to produce legislation prohibiting it, that

But such interpretations of employment
"discrimination against any individual . . .
based on sex" do not say anything about
whether discrimination based on other social
categories is covered by the statute. Just as
Congress adopted broader language than
discrimination "against women," it adopted
narrower language than "discrimination
based on personal characteristics or
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practice will remain legal. In the context of
private-sector
employment,
racial
discrimination was just as indefensible before
1964 as it is today, but it was not illegal.
Discrimination against women, as President
Kennedy's commission understood, was
just as unfair, and just as harmful to our
economy, before Title VII prohibited it as it
is now, but if Congress had not adopted
Representative Smith's amendment, it would
have
remained
legal.
Employment
discrimination against older workers, and
against qualified individuals with disabilities,
imposed unfair burdens on those categories
of individuals in 1964, yet it remained legal
after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became
law, because Congress did not at that time
choose to prohibit such discrimination.
Congress is permitted to choose what types
of social problems to attack and by which
means. The majority says that "we have
stated that 'Title VII should be interpreted
broadly to achieve equal employment
opportunity,'" but of course that dictum
appeared in the context of a discussion of
racial discrimination. Congress, in fact, did
not legislate in 1964 "broadly to achieve
equal
employment
opportunity"
for all Americans, but instead opted to
prohibit only certain categories of unfair
discrimination. It did not then prohibit, and
alas has not since prohibited, discrimination
based on sexual orientation.

orientation is not the same thing as
discrimination based on sex. As Judge Sykes
explained,
[t]o a fluent speaker of the English
language — then and now — the
ordinary meaning of the word "sex"
does not fairly include the concept of
"sexual orientation." The two terms
are never used interchangeably, and
the latter is not subsumed within the
former; there is no overlap in
meaning. . . . The words plainly
describe different traits, and the
separate and distinct meaning of each
term is easily grasped. More
specifically to the point here,
discrimination "because of sex" is not
reasonably understood to include
discrimination based on sexual
orientation, a different immutable
characteristic. Classifying people by
sexual orientation is different than
classifying them by sex.
Of course, the majority does not really
dispute this common-sense proposition. It
does not say that "sex discrimination" in the
ordinary meaning of the term is literally the
same thing as "sexual orientation
discrimination." Rather, the majority argues
that
discrimination
based
on
sex
encompasses discrimination against gay
people because discrimination based on sex
encompasses any distinction between the
sexes that an employer might make for any
reason. The argument essentially reads
"discriminate" to mean pretty much the same
thing as "distinguish." And indeed, there are
recognized English uses of "discriminate,"
particularly when followed with "between"

B
The majority's linguistic argument does not
change the fact that the prohibition of
employment discrimination "because of . . .
sex" does not protect gays and lesbians.
Simply put, discrimination based on sexual
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or "from," that imply nothing invidious, but
merely mean "to perceive, observe or note [a]
difference," or "[t]o make or recognize a
distinction." For example, a person with
perfect pitch is capable of discriminating a C
from a C-sharp. But in the language of civil
rights, a different and stronger meaning
applies, that references invidious distinctions:
"To treat a person or group in an unjust or
prejudicial manner, esp[ecially] on the
grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation,
etc.; frequently with against."

anyone else. And since no biological factor
can support any job qualification based on
race, courts have taken the view that to
distinguish is, for the most part, to
discriminate against. But in the area of sex
discrimination, where the groups to be treated
equally do have potentially relevant
biological differences, not every distinction
between men and women in the workplace
constitutes discrimination against one gender
or the other. The distinctions that were
prohibited, however, in either case, are those
that operate to the disadvantage of
(principally) the disfavored race or sex. That
is the social problem that the statute aimed to
correct.

And that is indeed the sense in which Title
VII uses the word: the statute prohibits such
practices as "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or
to discharge" persons on account of their race
or sex or other protected characteristic, or
"otherwise to discriminate against any
individual" with respect to employment
terms. In other words, it is an
oversimplification to treat the statute as
prohibiting any distinction between men and
women in the workplace, still less any
distinction that so much as requires the
employer to know an employee's sex in order
to be applied, the law prohibits
discriminating against members of one sex or
the other in the workplace.

Opponents of Title VII, and later of the Equal
Rights Amendment ("ERA"), were fond of
conjuring what they thought of as
unthinkable or absurd consequences of
gender equality. Some of those proved not so
unthinkable or absurd at all. Workplace
"protective" legislation that applied only to
women soon fell by the wayside, despite
Representative Cellar's fears, without
adverse consequences. But other distinctions
based on sex remain, and their legality is
either assumed, or at a minimum requires
more thought than just "but that's a
distinction based on sex, so it's illegal."

That point may have little bite in the context
of racial discrimination. The different "races"
are defined legally and socially, and not by
actual biological or genetic differences —
both Hitler's Nuremberg laws and American
laws imposing slavery and segregation had to
define, arbitrarily, how much ancestry of a
particular type consigned persons to a
disfavored category, since there is no
scientific or genetic basis for distinguishing a
"Jew" or a "member of the colored race" from

Distinctions based on personal privacy, for
example, remain in place. When opponents
of the ERA, like Senator Ervin, argued that
under the ERA "there can be no exception for
elements of publically [sic] imposed sexual
segregation on the basis of privacy between
men and women," that objection was derided
by Senator Marlow Cook of Kentucky as the
"potty" argument. Title VII too does not
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prohibit an employer from having separate
men's and women's toilet facilities. Nor does
it prohibit employer policies that differentiate
between men and women in setting
requirements regarding hair lengths. Thus,
in Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., we
held that a policy "requiring short hair on
men and not on women" did not violate Title
VII.

the use of gender-normed physical fitness
standards in the Title VII context, none has
deemed
such
standards
to
be
unlawful," because courts have recognized
that some physiological differences between
men and women "impact their relative
abilities to demonstrate the same levels of
physical
fitness," Thus,
the
court
in Bauer recognized that to distinguish
between the sexes is not always to
discriminate against one or the other. Indeed,
a failure to
impose
distinct
fitness
requirements for men and women may be
found to violate Title VII, if it has a disparate
impact on one sex and the employer cannot
justify the requirement as a business
necessity. Taken to its logical conclusion,
though, the majority's interpretation of Title
VII would do away with this understanding
of the Act.

Dress codes provide a more complicated
example. It is certainly arguable that some
forms of separate dress codes further
stereotypes harmful to workplace equality for
women; requiring female employees to wear
"Hooters"-style outfits but male employees
doing the same work to wear suit and tie
would not stand scrutiny. But what of a pool
facility that requires different styles of
bathing suit for male and female lifeguards?
Judge Cabranes's concurrence would seem to
prohibit that practice, but I believe, and I
expect Judge Cabranes would agree, that a
pool that required both male and female
lifeguards to wear a uniform consisting only
of trunks would violate Title VII, while one
that prescribed trunks for men and a bathing
suit covering the breasts for women would
not.

These examples suffice to illustrate two
points relevant to the supposedly simple
interpretation of sex-based discrimination
relied upon by the majority. First, it is not the
case that any employment practice that can
only be applied by identifying an employee's
sex is prohibited. Second, neither can it be the
case that any discrimination that would be
prohibited if race were the criterion is equally
prohibited when gender is used. Obviously,
Title VII does not permit an employer to
maintain racially segregated bathrooms, nor
would it allow different-colored or differentdesigned bathing costumes for white and
black lifeguards. Such distinctions would
smack of racial subordination, and would
impose degrading differences of treatment on
the basis of race. Precisely the same
distinctions between men and women would
not.

More controversial distinctions, such as
different fitness requirements for men and
women applying for jobs involving physical
strength, have also been upheld. In a recent
case, the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion
that Title VII prohibits gender-normed
physical fitness benchmarks pursuant to
which male FBI agent trainees must perform
30 push-ups, while female trainees need only
do 14. In upholding this distinction, the court
noted that of "the few decisions to confront
63

Nor does the example of "discrimination
based on traits that are a function of sex, such
as life expectancy," help the majority's cause.
Discrimination of that sort, as the majority
notes, could permit gross discrimination
against female employees "by using traits
that are associated with sex as a proxy for
sex." That is certainly so as to "traits that are
a function of sex," such as pregnancy or the
capacity to become pregnant. But it is not so
as to discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Same-sex attraction is not "a
function of sex" or "associated with sex" in
the sense that life expectancy or childbearing
capacity are. A refusal to hire gay people
cannot serve as a covert means of limiting
employment opportunities for men or for
women as such; a minority of both men and
women are gay, and discriminating against
them discriminates against them, as gay
people, and does not differentially
disadvantage employees or applicants of
either sex. That is not the case with other
forms of "sex-plus" discrimination that single
out for disfavored status traits that are, for
example, common to women but rare in men.

did the prohibition of sexual orientation
discrimination
come
by
judicial
interpretation of a pre-existing prohibition on
gender-based discrimination to encompass
discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Similarly, the Executive
Branch has prohibited discrimination against
gay men and lesbians in federal employment
by adding "sexual orientation" to previously
protected grounds. Finally, the same
approach has been reflected in the repeated
(but so far unsuccessful) introduction of bills
in Congress to add "sexual orientation" to the
list of prohibited grounds of employment
discrimination in Title VII.
The Department of Justice argues, relying
on Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., that Congress ratified judicial
interpretations of "sex" in Title VII as
excluding sexual orientation when it
amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991 and
failed to overrule judicial decisions holding
that the sex discrimination provision of Title
VII did not cover sexual orientation
discrimination. In Inclusive Communities,
the Supreme Court held that disparate-impact
claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act ("FHA"). In so holding, the Court found
it relevant that Congress had amended the
FHA after nine Courts of Appeals had held
that the FHA allowed for disparate-impact
claims, and did not alter the text of the Act in
a way that would make it clear that disparateimpact claims were not contemplated by the
FHA. Furthermore, the Court found it
significant that the legislative history of the
FHA amendment made it clear that Congress
was aware of those Court of Appeals
decisions. The majority dismisses this

C
That "because of . . . sex" did not, and still
does not, cover sexual orientation, is further
supported by the movement, in both
Congress and state legislatures, to enact
legislation protecting gay men and women
against employment discrimination. This
movement, which has now been successful in
twenty-two states — including all three in our
Circuit — and the District of Columbia, has
proceeded by expanding the categories of
prohibited discrimination in state antidiscrimination laws. In none of those states
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argument because at the time of the 1991
amendment to the Civil Rights Act, only
three Courts of Appeals had ruled that Title
VII did not cover sexual orientation, and
Congress did not make clear, in the
legislative history of the 1991 amendment,
that it was aware of this precedent.

Thus, to the extent that we can infer the
awareness of Congress at all, the continual
attempts to add sexual orientation to Title
VII, as well as the EEOC's determination
regarding the meaning of sex, should be
considered, in addition to the three appellate
court decisions, as evidence that Congress
was unquestionably aware, in 1991, of a
general consensus about the meaning of
"because of . . . sex," and of the fact that gay
rights advocates were seeking to change the
law by adding a new category of prohibited
discrimination to the statute.

In light of the clear textual and historical
meaning of the sex provision that I have
discussed above, I do not find it necessary to
rely heavily on the more technical argument
that strives to interpret the meaning of
statutes by congressional actions and
omissions that might be taken as ratifying
Court of Appeals decisions. But I do think it
is worth noting that the Supreme Court also
found it relevant, in Inclusive Communities,
that Congress had rejected a proposed
amendment "that would have eliminated
disparate-impact liability for certain zoning
decisions." Here, while only three Courts of
Appeals may have ruled on the issue by 1991,
over twenty-five amendments had been
proposed to add sexual orientation to Title
VII between 1964 and 1991. All had been
rejected. In fact, two amendments were
proposed in 1991, one in the House and one
in the Senate, Civil Rights Amendments Act
of 1991, S. 574, 102d Congress; Civil Rights
Amendments Act of 1991, H.R. 1430, 102d
Congress, and neither of those amendments
found its way into the omnibus bill that
overruled other judicial interpretations of the
Civil Rights Act. Moreover, in addition to the
three Courts of Appeals that had ruled on the
issue, the EEOC — the primary agency
charged by Congress with interpreting and
enforcing Title VII — had also held, by 1991,
that sexual orientation discrimination fell
"outside the purview of Title VII."

Although the Supreme Court has rightly
cautioned against relying on legislative
inaction as evidence of congressional intent,
because "several equally tenable inferences
may be drawn from such inaction, including
the inference that the existing legislation
already
incorporated
the
offered
change," surely the proposal and rejection of
over fifty amendments to add sexual
orientation to Title VII means something. .
And it is pretty clear what it does not mean.
It is hardly reasonable, in light of the EEOC
and
judicial
consensus
that
sex
discrimination did not encompass sexual
orientation discrimination, to conclude that
Congress rejected the proposed amendments
because senators and representatives
believed that Title VII "already incorporated
the offered change." There may be many
reasons why each proposal ultimately failed,
but it cannot reasonably be claimed that the
basic reason that Congress did not pass such
an amendment year in and year out was
anything other than that there was not yet the
political will to do so.
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This last point requires one further
disclaimer. As with the social pre-history of
Title VII, these later developments are not
referenced in a dubious effort to infer the
specific intentions of the members of
Congress who voted for the Smith
amendment in 1964, nor are they referenced
to infer the specific intent of each Congress
that was faced with proposed sexual
orientation amendments. The point, rather, is
that race, gender, and sexual orientation
discrimination have been consistently
perceived in the political world, and by the
American population as a whole, as different
practices presenting different social and
political issues. At different times over the
last few generations, the recognition of each
as a problem to be remedied by legislation
has been controversial, with the movements
to define each form of discrimination as
illegal developing at a different pace and for
different reasons, and being opposed in each
case by different coalitions for different
reasons. To recognize this fact is to
understand that discrimination against
persons based on sex has had, in law and in
politics, a meaning that is separate from that
of discrimination based on sexual orientation.

been found to violate Title VII, and certain
others have not. Discrimination against
persons whose sexual orientation is
homosexual rather than heterosexual,
however offensive such discrimination may
be to me and to many others, is not
discrimination that treats men and women
differently. The simplistic argument that
discrimination against gay men and women is
sex discrimination because targeting persons
sexually attracted to others of the same sex
requires noticing the gender of the person in
question is not a fair reading of the text of the
statute, and has nothing to do with the type of
unfairness in employment that Congress
legislated against in adding "sex" to the list of
prohibited categories of discrimination in
Title VII.
III
The majority opinion goes on to identify two
other arguments in support of its holding: (1)
that sexual orientation discrimination is
actually
"gender
stereotyping"
that
constitutes discrimination against individuals
based on their sex, and (2) that such
discrimination
constitutes
prohibited
"associational discrimination" analogous to
discriminating against employees who are
married to members of a different race.

In short, Title VII's prohibition of
employment
discrimination
against
individuals on the basis of their sex is aimed
at employment practices that differentially
disadvantage men vis-à-vis women or
women vis-à-vis men. That is what the
language of the statute means to an ordinary
"fluent speaker of the English language," that
is the social practice that Congress chose to
legislate against, and in light of that
understanding, certain laws and practices that
distinguish between men and women have

These arguments have the merit of
attempting to link discrimination based on
sexual orientation to the social problem of
gender discrimination at which Title VII is
aimed. But just as the "differential treatment"
argument attempts to shoehorn sexual
orientation discrimination into the statute's
verbal template of discrimination based on
sex, these arguments attempt a similar (also
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unsuccessful) maneuver with lines of case
law. While certain Supreme Court cases
identify clear-cut examples of sex or race
discrimination that may have a superficial
similarity to the practice at issue here, the
majority mistakes that similarity for a
substantive one.

positions, or are less adept at the
mathematical and practical skills demanded
of engineers, can be a significant hindrance
to women seeking such positions, even when
a particular woman is demonstrably
qualified, or indeed even where empirical
data show that on average women perform as
well as or better than men on the relevant
tasks. Refusing to hire or promote someone
because of that sort of gender (or racial, or
ethnic, or religious) stereotyping is not a
separate form of sex (or race, or ethnic, or
religious) discrimination, but is precisely
discrimination in hiring or promotion based
on sex (or race, or ethnicity, or religion). It
treats applicants or employees not as
individuals but as members of a class that is
disfavored for purposes of the employment
decision by reason of a trait stereotypically
assigned to members of that group as a
whole. For the most part, then, the kind of
stereotyping that leads to discriminatory
employment decisions that violate Title VII
is the assignment of traits that are negatively
associated with job performance (dishonesty,
laziness, greed, submissiveness) to members
of a particular protected class.

A
Perhaps the most appealing of the majority's
approaches is its effort to treat sexual
orientation discrimination as an instance of
sexual stereotyping. The argument proceeds
from the premises that "sex stereotyping
violates Title VII," and that "same-sex
orientation 'represents the ultimate case of
failure to conform' to gender stereotypes,"
and concludes that an employer who
discriminates against gay people is therefore
"sex stereotyping" and thus violating Title
VII. But like the other arguments adopted by
the majority, this approach rests more on
verbal facility than on social reality.
In unpacking the majority's syllogism, it is
first necessary to address what we mean by
"sex stereotyping" that "violates Title VII."
Invidious stereotyping of members of racial,
gender, national, or religious groups is at the
heart of much employment discrimination.
Most employers do not entertain, let alone
admit to, older forms of racialist or other
discriminatory ideologies that hold that
members of certain groups are inherently or
genetically inferior and undeserving of equal
treatment. Much more common are
assumptions, not always even conscious, that
associate certain negative traits with
particular groups. A perception that women,
for example, are not suited to executive

Clearly, sexual orientation discrimination is
not an example of that kind of sex
stereotyping; an employer who disfavors a
male job applicant whom he believes to be
gay does not do so because the employer
believes that most men are gay and therefore
unsuitable. Rather, he does so because he
believes that most gay people (whether male
or female) have some quality that makes
them undesirable for the position, and that
because this applicant is gay, he must also
possess that trait. Although that is certainly
stereotyping, and invidiously so, it does not
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stereotype a group protected by Title VII, and
is therefore not (yet) illegal.

equally problematic, sexist foundations: a
female employee or applicant may be
prejudiced by a negative assumption that
women aren't or can't be sufficiently
dominant for a position that requires
leadership or strength or aggression, but
when a woman unquestionably does show the
putatively desired traits, she is held back
because of the different but related notion
that women shouldn't be aggressive or
dominant. The latter is not an assumption
about how most women are, it is a normative
belief about howall women should be.

But as the majority correctly points out, that
is not the only way in which stereotyping can
be an obstacle to protected classes of people
in the workplace. The stereotyping discussed
above involves beliefs about how members
of a particular protected category are, but
there are also stereotypes (or more simply,
beliefs) about how members of that group
should be. In the case of sex discrimination in
particular, stereotypes about how women
ought to look or behave can create a double
bind. For example, a woman who is
perceived through the lens of a certain
"feminine" stereotype may be assumed to be
insufficiently assertive for certain positions
by contrast to men who, viewed through the
lens of a "masculine" stereotype, are
presumed more likely to excel in situations
that demand assertiveness. At the same time,
the employer may fault a woman who
behaves as assertively as a male comparator
for being too aggressive, thereby failing to
comply with societal expectations of
femininity.

I fully accept the conclusion that that kind of
discrimination is prohibited, and that it
imposes different conditions of employment
on men and on women. Not only does such
discrimination require women to behave
differently in the workplace than men, but it
also actively deters women from engaging in
kinds of behavior that are required for
advancement to certain positions, and thus
effectively
bars
them
from
such
advancement. The key element here is that
one sex is systematically disadvantaged in a
particular workplace. In that circumstance,
sexual stereotyping is sex discrimination.

That is the situation that a plurality of the
Supreme Court identified in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the key case the
majority relies on for its "sex stereotyping"
argument. As that opinion pointed out, "[a]n
employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait
places women in an intolerable and
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they
behave aggressively and out of a job if they
do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind."
The two horns of the dilemma described in
Price Waterhouse have slightly different, yet

But as Judge Sykes points out in
her Hively dissent, the homophobic employer
is not deploying a stereotype about men or
about women to the disadvantage of either
sex. Such an employer is expressing
disapproval of the behavior or identity of a
class of people that includes both men and
women. That disapproval does not stem from
a desire to discriminate against either sex, nor
does it result from any sex-specific
stereotype, nor does it differentially harm
either men or women vis-à-vis the other sex.
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Rather, it results from a distinct type of
objection to anyone, of whatever gender, who
is identified as homosexual. The belief on
which it rests is not a belief about what men
or women ought to be or do; it is a belief
about what all people ought to be or do — to
be heterosexual, and to have sexual attraction
to or relations with only members of the
opposite sex. That does not make workplace
discrimination based on this belief better or
worse than other kinds of discrimination, but
it does make it something different from sex
discrimination, and therefore something that
is not prohibited by Title VII.

let alone marriage and reproduction, between
African-Americans and whites. A prohibition
on "race-mixing" was thus grounded in
bigotry against a particular race and was an
integral part of preserving the rigid
hierarchical distinction that denominated
members of the black race as inferior to
whites.
Thus, as the Supreme Court noted in striking
down Virginia's law prohibiting marriage
between a white person and a person of color,
the Supreme Court of Virginia had upheld the
statute because Virginia defined its
"legitimate" purposes as "'preserv[ing] the
racial integrity of [the state's] citizens,' and []
prevent[ing] 'the corruption of blood,' 'a
mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the
obliteration of racial pride,'" purposes the
Court correctly identified and rejected
as "obviously an endorsement of the doctrine
of White Supremacy.” The racist hostility to
"race-mixing" extended well beyond a
prohibition against interracial marriage. The
beatings of "freedom riders" attempting to
integrate interstate bus lines in the South in
the early 1960s, inflicted on white as well as
black participants in the protests,
demonstrated that racial bigotry against
African-Americans manifested itself in direct
attacks not only on African-Americans, but
also on whites who associated with AfricanAmericans as equals. The entire system of
"separate but equal" segregation in both stateowned and private facilities and places of
public accommodation was designed, as
Charles Black made plain in a classic
deconstruction of the legal fiction of
"separate but equal," to confine black people
to "a position of inferiority." Thus, the
associational discrimination reflected in

B
The "associational discrimination" theory is
no more persuasive. That theory rests on
cases involving race discrimination. Many
courts have found that Title VII prohibits
discrimination in cases in which, as in our
case of Holcomb v. Iona College, a white
plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he
was married to a person of a different race.
It would require absolute blindness to the
history of racial discrimination in this
country not to understand what is at stake in
such cases, and why such allegations
unmistakably state a claim of discrimination
against an individual employee on the basis
of race. Anti-miscegenation laws constituted
a bulwark of the structure of institutional
racism that is the paradigm of invidious
discrimination in this country. AfricanAmericans were condemned first to slavery,
and then to second-class citizenship and
virtual apartheid, on the basis of an ideology
that regarded them as inferior. Such an
ideology is incompatible with fraternization,
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cases such as Loving and Holcomb was a
product of bigotry against a single race by
another. That discrimination is expressly
prohibited in employment by Title VII.

"discriminatory animus" — against members
of the race with whom the plaintiffs
associated. There is no allegation in this case,
nor could there plausibly be, that the
defendant discriminated against Zarda
because it had something against men, and
therefore discriminated not only against men,
but also against anyone, male or female, who
associated with them. I have no trouble
assuming
that
the
principle
of Holcomb and Barrett applies beyond the
category of race discrimination: an employer
who fired or refused to promote an AngloAmerican, Christian employee because she
associated with Latinos or Jews would
presumably run afoul of that principle just as
much as one whose animus ran against black
Americans. Such an employer would clearly
be discriminating against the employee on
the basis of her friends' ethnicity or religion
—
in
the
formulation
from
the Barrett opinion, that employer would be
victimizing
an
employee
out
of
"discriminatory animus toward protected
third persons with whom the [employee]
associate[d]."

Workplace equality for racial minorities is
thus blatantly incompatible with a practice
that ostracizes, demeans, or inflicts adverse
conditions on white employees for marrying,
dating, or otherwise associating with, people
of color. The prohibition of that kind of
discrimination is not simply a matter of
noting that, in order to effectuate it, the
employer must identify the races of the
employee and the person(s) with whom he or
she associates. Just as sexual harassment
against female employees presents a serious
obstacle to the full and equal participation of
women in the workplace, discrimination
against members of a favored race who so
much as associate with persons of another
race reflects a deep-seated bigotry against the
disfavored race(s) that Title VII undertakes to
banish from the workplace. The principle
was well stated by the Sixth Circuit in a case
cited by the majority, Barrett v. Whirlpool
Corporation:

It is more difficult to imagine realistic
hypotheticals in which an employer
discriminated against anyone who so much as
associated with men or with women, though
I suppose academic examples of such
behavior could be conjured. But whatever
such a case might look like, discrimination
against gay people is not it. Discrimination
against gay men, for example, plainly is not
rooted in animus toward "protected third
persons with whom [they] associate." An
employer who practices such discrimination
is hostile to gay men, not to men in general;
the animus runs not, as in the race and

Title VII protects individuals who,
though not members of a protected
class, are victims of discriminatory
animus toward protected third
persons with whom the individuals
associate.
Discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, however, is not discrimination of
the sort at issue in Holcomb and Barrett. In
those cases, the plaintiffs alleged that they
were discriminated against because the
employer was biased — that is, had a
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religion cases discussed above, against a
"protected group" to which the employee's
associates belong, but against an (alas)
unprotected group to which they belong:
other gay men.

individuals' ideas (religious or secular) about
how families are best structured. Rather, it
prohibits overt acts: discrimination in hiring,
promotion, and the terms and conditions of
employment based on sex. Similarly, states,
like those in our Circuit, that have prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation do
not seek to eradicate disapproval of
homosexual practices (whether rooted in
religious belief or misogyny or some other
theory, or caused by some conditioned or
other visceral reaction). People may believe
what they like, but they may not discriminate
in employment against those whose
characteristics or behaviors place them
within the ambit of a protected category.
Unlike those states, though, Congress has not
enacted such a prohibition, and the fact that
some of us believe that sexual orientation
discrimination is unfair for much the same
reasons that we disapprove of sex
discrimination does not change that reality.

The majority tries to rebut this
straightforward distinction in various ways.
First, it notes — but declines to rely on —
academic "research suggesting that sexual
orientation
discrimination
has
deep
misogynistic roots." It is certainly plausible
to me that the "deep roots" of hostility to
homosexuals are in some way related to the
same sorts of beliefs about the proper roles of
men and women in family life that underlie at
least some employment discrimination
against women. It may also be that the "roots"
of all forms of discrimination against people
who are different in some way from a socially
defined dominant group can be found in
similar
psychological
processes
of
discomfort with change or difference, or with
"authoritarian personality traits"— or that
there are other links among different forms of
prejudice. And it can plausibly be argued that
homosexual men have historically been
derided because they were seen as abdicating
their masculinity, and therefore the
advantage they have over women.

Second, the majority suggests that my
analysis of associational discrimination is
"squarely foreclosed by" cases like Oncale. It
is not. As noted above, I do not maintain that
Title VII prohibits only those practices that
its framers might have been principally
concerned with, or only what was
"traditionally," seen as sex discrimination. To
reiterate: sexual harassment plays a large role
in hindering women's entry into, and
advancement in, the workplace, and thus it is
no surprise that courts have interpreted Title
VII to prohibit it. And because Title VII
protects both men and women from such
practices, it does not matter whether the
victim is male or female. Sexual harassment
in the workplace quite literally imposes
conditions of employment on one sex that are

But the majority is right not to go searching
for such roots, whatever they might be,
because legislation is not typically
concerned, and Title VII manifestly is not
concerned, with defining and eliminating the
"deep roots" of biased attitudes. Congress
legislates against concrete behavior that
represents a perceived social problem. Title
VII does not prohibit "misogyny" or
"sexism," nor does it undertake to revise
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not imposed on the other, and it does not
matter whether the employer who perpetrates
such discriminatory disadvantage is male or
female, or of the same or different sex than
the employee. The victim of discrimination in
such situations is selected by his or her sex,
and the disadvantage is imposed on him or
her by reason of his or her membership in the
protected class. It is not a question of what is
"traditionally conceptualized as sexism." It is
a question of the public meaning of the words
adopted by Congress in light of the social
problem it was addressing when it chose
those words.

people in our society — both those who are
hostile to homosexuals and those who
deplore such hostility — understand bias
against or disapproval of those who are
sexually attracted to persons of their own sex
as a distinct type of prejudice, and not as
merely a form of discrimination against
either men or women on the basis of sex.
The majority asserts that discrimination
against gay people is nothing more than a
subspecies of discrimination against one or
the other gender. Discrimination against gay
men and lesbians is wrong, however, because
it denies the dignity and equality of gay men
and lesbians, and not because, in a purely
formal sense, it can be said to treat men
differently from women. It is understandable
that those who seek to achieve legal
protection for gay people victimized by
discrimination search for innovative
arguments to classify workplace bias against
gays as a form of discrimination that is
already prohibited by federal law. But the
arguments advanced by the majority ignore
the evident meaning of the language of Title
VII, the social realities that distinguish
between the kinds of biases that the statute
sought to exclude from the workplace from
those it did not, and the distinctive nature of
anti-gay prejudice. Accordingly, much as I
might wish it were otherwise, I must
conclude that those arguments fail.

C
In the end, perhaps all of these arguments, on
both sides, boil down to a disagreement about
how discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation should be conceptualized.
Whether based on linguistic arguments or
associational theories or notions of
stereotyping, the majority's arguments
attempt to draw theoretical links between one
kind of discrimination and another: to find
ways to reconceptualize discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation as
discrimination on the basis of sex. It is hard
to believe that there would be much appetite
for this kind of recharacterization if the law
expressly prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination, or that any opponent of
sexual orientation discrimination would
oppose the addition of sexual orientation to
the list of protected characteristics in Title
VII on the ground that to do so would be
redundant
or
would
express
a
misunderstanding of the nature of
discrimination against men and women who
are gay. I believe that the vast majority of

IV
The law with respect to the rights of gay
people has advanced considerably since
1964. Much of that development has been by
state legislation. As noted above, for
example, twenty-two states now prohibit, by
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explicit
legislative
pronouncement,
employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. But other advances have
come by means of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Constitution. Perhaps the
most striking advance, from the vantage of
the early 1960s, has been the legalization of
same-sex marriage as a matter of
constitutional law.

Constitution is distinctively different from
their role in interpreting acts of Congress.
There are several reasons for this.
First, the entire point of the Constitution is to
delimit the powers that have been granted by
the people to their government. Our
Constitution creates a republican form of
government, in which the democratically
elected representatives of the majority of the
people are granted the power to set policy.
But the powers of those representatives are
constrained by a written text, which prevents
a popular majority — both in the federal
Congress and, since the Civil War
Amendments, in state legislatures — from
violating certain fundamental rights. As
every law student reads in his or her first-year
constitutional law class, "[t]he powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written." To the
extent that the courts exercise a nondemocratic or counter-majoritarian power,
they do so in the name of those rights.
Particular exercises of that power, including
the gay rights decisions of this new
millennium, may be controversial, and fierce
disagreements exist over the legitimacy of
various
methods
of
constitutional
interpretation. And it is not controversial that
the power to assess the constitutionality of
legislation must be exercised with restraint,
and with a due deference to the judgments of
elected officials who themselves have taken
an oath to defend the Constitution. But it has
long been generally accepted that the courts
have a special role to play in defending the
liberties enshrined in the Constitution against
encroachment even by the people's elected
representatives.

Nothing that I have said in this opinion
should be interpreted as expressing any
disagreement with the line of cases running
from Lawrence v. Texas, through Obergefell
v. Hodges. But those cases provide no
support for the plaintiff's position in this case,
or for the method of interpretation utilized by
the majority.
For one thing, it is noteworthy that none of
the Supreme Court's landmark constitutional
decisions upholding the rights of gay
Americans depend on the argument that laws
disadvantaging homosexuals constitute
merely a species of the denial of equal
protection of the laws on the basis of gender,
or attempt to assimilate discrimination
against gay people to the kinds of sex
discrimination that were found to violate
equal protection in cases like Frontiero v.
Richardson, Craig v. Boren, and Orr v. Orr,
in the 1970s. Instead, the Court's gay rights
cases were based on the guarantee of
"liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
There is also a more fundamental difference.
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area
are based on the Constitution of the United
States, rather than a specific statute, and the
role of the courts in interpreting the
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Within the limits imposed by constitutional
principles, however, the will of the majority,
as expressed in legislation adopted by the
people's representatives, governs. As the
Supreme Court has instructed, the role of
courts with respect to statutes is simply "to
apply the statute as it is written — even if we
think some other approach might accord with
good policy." Just last Term, a unanimous
Supreme Court foreclosed judicial efforts to
"update" statutes, declaring that, although
"reasonable people can disagree" whether,
following the passage of time, "Congress
should reenter the field and alter the
judgments it made in the past[,] . . . the proper
role of the judiciary in that process . . . [is] to
apply, not amend, the work of the People's
representatives." In interpreting statutes,
courts must not merely show deference or
restraint; their obligation is to do their best to
understand, in a socially and politically
realistic way, what decisions the democratic
branches of government have embodied in
the language they voted for (and what they
have not), and to interpret statutes
accordingly in deciding cases.

searches and seizures." It does not, as
relevant here, identify particular types of
discriminatory actions by state governments
that it undertakes to forbid; it demands that
those governments provide to all people
within our borders "the equal protection of
the laws."
Legislation, in contrast, can and often does
set policy in minute detail. It does not
necessarily concern itself with deep general
principles. Rather, legislators are entitled to
pick and choose which problems to address,
and how far to go in addressing them. Within
the limits of constitutional guarantees,
Congress is given "wide latitude" to legislate,
City of Boerne, but courts must struggle to
define those limits by giving coherent
meaning to broad constitutional principles.
The majestic guarantee of equal protection in
the Fourteenth Amendment is a very different
kind of pronouncement than the prohibition,
in Title VII, of specific kinds of
discrimination, by a specified subset of
employers, based on clearly defined
categories. The language of the Constitution
thus allows a broader scope for interpretation.

Second, the rights conferred by the
Constitution are written in broad language.
As the great Chief Justice Marshall
commented, our Constitution is "one of
enumeration, and not of definition."
Examples are easily cited: The Constitution
does not contain a list of specific
punishments that are too cruel to be imposed;
it prohibits, in general language, "cruel and
unusual punishments." It does not enact a
code of police procedure that explains
exactly what kinds of searches the police may
conduct,
under
what
particular
circumstances; it prohibits "unreasonable

Third, and following in part from above, the
Constitution requires some flexibility of
interpretation, because it is intended to
endure; it was deliberately designed to be
difficult to amend. It is difficult to amend
because the framers believed that certain
principles were foundational and, for
practical purposes, all but eternal, and should
not be subject to the political winds of the
moment. A constitution is, to quote Chief
Justice Marshall yet again, "framed for ages
to come, and is designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions
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can approach it." The choice of broad
language reflects the framers' goal: they did
not choose to prohibit "cruel and unusual
punishments," rather than listing prohibited
punishments, simply to save space, on the
assumption that future courts could consult
extra-constitutional sources to identify what
particular penalties they had in mind; they did
so in order to enshrine a general principle,
leaving its instantiation and elaboration to
future interpreters.

notwithstanding criticisms of "gridlock" and
praise of "checks and balances" — of acting
to repeal, extend, or modify prior enactments.
In interpreting the Constitution, courts speak
to the ages; in interpreting legislation, federal
courts speak to — and essentially for —
Congress, which can always correct our
mistakes, or revise legislation in light of
changing political and social realities.
Finally, the Constitution, as noted above, is
designed, with very limited exceptions, to
govern the government. The commands of
equal protection and respect for liberties that
can only be denied by due process of law tell
us how a government must behave when it
regulates the people who created it.
Legislation, however, generally governs the
people themselves, in their relation with each
other.

Those enduring principles would not, could
not, endure if they were incapable of
adaptation — at times via judicial
interpretation
—
to
new
social
circumstances, as well as new understandings
of old problems. That idea is not new. In
1910, the Supreme Court wrote, in the
context of the Eighth Amendment, that
"[t]ime works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle, to be vital, must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of
constitutions. More recently, in Obergefell,
the Court noted that "in interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court has recognized
that new insights and societal understandings
can reveal unjustified inequality within our
most fundamental institutions that once
passed unnoticed and unchallenged."

The question of how the government, acting
at the behest of a possibly temporary political
majority, is permitted to treat the people it
governs, is a different question, and is
answered by reference to different principles,
than the question of what obligations should
be imposed on private citizens. The former
question must ultimately be answered by
courts under the principles adopted in the
Constitution. The latter is entrusted primarily
to the legislative process. Courts interpreting
statutes are not in the business of imposing on
private actors new rules that have not been
embodied in legislative decision. It is for that
reason that segregation in public facilities
was struck down by constitutional command,
long before segregation of private facilities
was prohibited by federal legislation adopted
by Congress. Whether or not the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments have something to

Legislation, on the other hand, is not intended
to last forever. It must be consistent with
constitutional principles, and ideally it will be
inspired by a principled concept of ordered
liberty. But it nevertheless remains the
domain of practical political compromise.
Congress and the state legislatures are in
frequent session, and are capable —
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say about whether the state and federal
governments
may
discriminate
in
employment against gay Americans — a
question that is not before us, and about
which I express no view — it is the
prerogative of Congress or a state legislature
to decide whether private employers may do
so.

must never forget that it is not a Constitution
we are expounding. When interpreting an act
of Congress, we need to respect the choices
made by Congress about which social
problems to address, and how to address
them. In 1964, Congress — belatedly —
prohibited employment discrimination based
on race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and national
origin. Many
states
have
similarly
recognized the injustice of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. In doing so,
they have called such discrimination by its
right name, and taken a firm and explicit
stand against it. I hope that one day soon
Congress will join them, and adopt that
principle on a national basis. But it has not
done so yet.

In its amicus submission, the EEOC quite
reasonably asks whether it is just that a gay
employee can be married on Sunday, and
fired on Monday — discriminated against at
his or her job for exercising a right that is
protected by the Constitution. I would answer
that it is not just. But at the same time, I
recognize that the law does not prohibit every
injustice. The Constitution protects the
liberty of gay people to marry against
deprivation by their government, but it does
not promise freedom from discrimination by
their fellow citizens. That is hardly a novel
proposition: absent Title VII, the same
injustice could have been inflicted on the
Lovings themselves. The Constitution
protected them against governmental
discrimination, but (except for specific
vestiges of
slavery prohibited by
the Thirteenth Amendment) only an act of
Congress can prohibit one individual from
discriminating against another in housing,
public accommodations, and employment. It
is well to remember that whether to prohibit
race and sex discrimination was a
controversial political question in 1964.
Imposing an obligation on private employers
to treat women and minorities fairly required
political organizing and a political fight.

For these reasons, I respectfully, and
regretfully, dissent.
LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I dissent for substantially the reasons set forth
in Sections I, II, and III of Judge Lynch's
opinion, and I join in those sections. I share
in the commitment that all individuals in the
workplace be treated fairly, and that
individuals not be subject to workplace
discrimination on the basis of their sexual
orientation, just as on the basis of their "race,
color, religion, sex, [and] national origin." I
cannot conclude, however, as the majority
does, that sexual orientation discrimination is
a "subset" of sex discrimination, et passim,
and is therefore included among the
prohibited
grounds
of
workplace
discrimination listed in Title VII.
The majority's efforts founder on the simple
question of how a reasonable reader,

At the end of the day, to paraphrase Chief
Justice Marshall, in interpreting statutes we
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competent in the language and its use, would
have understood Title VII's text when it was
written — on the question of its public
meaning at the time of enactment. The
majority acknowledges the argument "that it
is not 'even remotely plausible that in 1964,
when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable
person competent in the English language
would have understood that a law banning
employment discrimination 'because of sex'
also banned discrimination because of sexual
orientation.'" It does not contest the point,
however, but seeks merely to justify its
departure from ordinary, contemporary
meaning by claiming that "[e]ven if that [is]
so," its approach no more departs from the
ordinary meaning of words in their
contemporary context than supposedly
occurred when sexual harassment and hostile
work environment claims were first
recognized by courts. But as Judge Lynch has
cogently explained, that is simply not the
case. The majority does not discover a "plain"
yet hidden meaning in Title VII, sufficiently
obscure as to wholly elude every appellate
court, including this one, until the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll. of Ind., last year. Instead, it sub silentio
abandons our usual approach to statutory
interpretation.

constitutional liberties against encroachment
by government, in statutory interpretation,
courts "are not in the business of imposing on
private actors new rules that have not been
embodied in legislative decision." To do so
chips away at the democratic and rule-of-law
principles on which our system of
governance is founded — the very principles
we rely on to secure the legitimacy and the
efficacy
of
our
laws,
including
antidiscrimination legislation.
The Supreme Court said unanimously, just
last Term, that the proper role of the judiciary
in statutory interpretation is "to apply, not
amend, the work of the People's
representatives," even when reasonable
people might believe that "Congress should
reenter the field and alter the judgments it
made in the past." "[I]t is for Congress, not
the courts, to write the law," and where
"Congress' . . . decisions are mistaken as a
matter of policy, it is for Congress to change
them. We should not legislate for them."
This
hornbook
separation-of-powers
principle and the reasons behind it need not
be elaborated here, for both should be well
known to every law student. Together, they
explain why judges interpreting statutes do
their best to discern the ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning of the
statute's language. This is the law that was
enacted through the democratic process, and
the law we are to apply.

Because Sections I, II, and III of Judge
Lynch's dissent are sufficient to answer the
statutory question that this case presents, I do
not go further to address the subject of
constitutional interpretation, and do not join
in Section IV. I agree with Judge Lynch,
however, that constitutional and statutory
interpretation should not be confused: that
while courts sometimes may be called upon
to play a special role in defending

This approach does not always yield results
that satisfy the judge charged with the task of
statutory interpretation. It has not done so
today. But I cannot faithfully join in the
majority's
opinion.
I
agree
with
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Judge Lynch that when Title VII was written
and, indeed, today, "bias against or
disapproval of those who are sexually
attracted to persons of their own sex" was and
is viewed "as a distinct type of prejudice,"
and not as a subcategory of "discrimination
against either men or women on the basis of
sex." Dissenting Op. at 56. Accordingly, and
agreeing with him that in interpreting an act
of Congress, we must "respect the choices
made by Congress about which social
problems to address, and how to address
them,” I respectfully dissent.

RAGGI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
A majority of the court today extends Title
VII's
prohibition
of
employment
discrimination "because of . . . sex," to
discrimination based on sexual orientation. I
respectfully dissent substantially for the
reasons stated by Judge Lynch in Parts I, II,
and III of his dissenting opinion and by
Judge Livingston in her dissenting opinion.
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay
and Transgender Workers”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
April 22, 2019
The Supreme Court announced on Monday
that it would decide whether the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 guarantees protections from
workplace discrimination to gay and
transgender people in three cases expected to
provide the first indication of how the court’s
new conservative majority will approach
L.G.B.T. rights.

sexual orientation discrimination. But two of
them, in New York and Chicago, recently
issued decisions ruling that discrimination
against gay men and lesbians is a form of sex
discrimination.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
from New York, Altitude Express Inc. v.
Zarda, No. 17-1623, along with one from
Georgia that came to the opposite
conclusion, Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga.,
No. 17-1618.

The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has said the 1964 act does
guarantee the protections. But the Trump
administration has taken the opposite
position, saying that the landmark legislation
that outlawed discrimination based on race,
religion, national origin and, notably, sex,
cannot fairly be read to apply to
discrimination based on sexual orientation or
transgender status.

The New York case was brought by a
skydiving instructor, Donald Zarda, who said
he was fired because he was gay. His
dismissal followed a complaint from a female
customer who had voiced concerns about
being tightly strapped to Mr. Zarda during a
tandem dive. Mr. Zarda, hoping to reassure
the customer, told her that he was “100
percent gay.”

The three cases the court accepted are the first
concerning
L.G.B.T.
rights
since
the retirement last summer of Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, a champion of gay
rights. His replacement by the more
conservative Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh
could shift the court’s approach to cases
concerning gay men, lesbians and
transgender people.

Mr. Zarda sued under Title VII and lost the
initial rounds. He died in a 2014 skydiving
accident, and his estate pursued his case.
Last year, a divided 13-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit allowed the lawsuit to
proceed. Writing for the majority, Chief
Judge Robert A. Katzmann concluded

Most federal appeals courts have interpreted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to exclude
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that “sexual orientation discrimination is
motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus
a subset of sex discrimination.”

The justices also agreed to decide the
separate question of whether Title VII bars
discrimination against transgender people.
The case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes
v.
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission, No. 18-107, concerns Aimee
Stephens, who was fired from a Michigan
funeral home after she announced in 2013
that she was a transgender woman and would
start working in women’s clothing.

In dissent, Judge Gerard E. Lynch wrote that
the words of Title VII did not support the
majority’s interpretation.
“Speaking solely as a citizen,” he wrote, “I
would be delighted to awake one morning
and learn that Congress had just passed
legislation adding sexual orientation to the
list of grounds of employment discrimination
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. I am confident that one day —
and I hope that day comes soon — I will have
that pleasure.”

“What I must tell you is very difficult for me
and is taking all the courage I can muster,”
she wrote to her colleagues. “I have felt
imprisoned in a body that does not match my
mind, and this has caused me great despair
and loneliness.”

“I would be equally pleased to awake to learn
that Congress had secretly passed such
legislation more than a half-century ago —
until I actually woke up and realized that I
must have been still asleep and dreaming,”
Judge Lynch wrote. “Because we all know
that Congress did no such thing.”

Ms. Stephens had worked at the funeral home
for six years. Her colleagues testified that she
was able and compassionate.
Two weeks after receiving the letter, the
home’s owner, Thomas Rost, fired Ms.
Stephens. Asked for the “specific reason that
you terminated Stephens,” Mr. Rost said:
“Well, because he was no longer going to
represent himself as a man. He wanted to
dress as a woman.”

The arguments in the Second Circuit had a
curious feature: Lawyers for the federal
government appeared on both sides. One
lawyer, representing the E.E.O.C., said Title
VII barred discrimination against gay people.
Another,
representing
the
Trump
administration, took the contrary view.

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled for Ms.
Stephens. Discrimination against transgender
people, the court said, was barred by Title
VII.

The Georgia case was brought by a child
welfare services coordinator who said he was
fired for being gay. The 11th Circuit, in
Atlanta, ruled against him in a short,
unsigned
opinion that
cited a
1979
decision that had ruled that “discharge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title
VII.”

“It is analytically impossible to fire an
employee based on that employee’s status as
a transgender person without being
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s
sex,” the court said, adding, “Discrimination
‘because of sex’ inherently includes
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discrimination against employees because of
a change in their sex.”

the Supreme Court might rule on whether
Title VII applies to discrimination against
transgender people. In 1989, the court
said discrimination against workers because
they did not conform to gender stereotypes
was a form of sex discrimination.

John J. Bursch, a lawyer with Alliance
Defending Freedom, which represents the
funeral home, said the appeals court had
impermissibly revised the federal law.

The Sixth Circuit ruled for Ms. Stephens on
that ground, too, saying she had been fired
“for wishing to appear or behave in a manner
that contradicts the funeral home’s
perception of how she should behave or
appear based on her sex.”

“Neither government agencies nor the courts
have authority to rewrite federal law by
replacing ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity’ — a
change with widespread consequences for
everyone,” Mr. Bursch said in a statement.
“The funeral home wants to serve families
mourning the loss of a loved one, but the
E.E.O.C. has elevated its political goals
above the interests of the grieving people that
the funeral home serves.”

All three cases present the question of how
courts should interpret statutes whose
drafters might not have contemplated the
sweep of the language they wrote.

James D. Esseks, a lawyer with the American
Civil Liberties Union, which represents Ms.
Stephens and Mr. Zarda’s estate, said the
cases concern elementary principles of
fairness.

In January, in a minor arbitration case,
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch wrote that courts
should ordinarily interpret statutes as they
were understood at the time of their
enactment. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that was not
always so.

“Most of America would be shocked if the
Supreme Court said it was legal to fire Aimee
because she’s transgender or Don because he
is gay,” Mr. Esseks said in a statement. “Such
a ruling would be disastrous, relegating
L.G.B.T.Q. people around the country to a
second-class citizen status.”

“Congress,” she wrote, “may design
legislation to govern changing times and
circumstances.” Quoting from an earlier
decision, she added: “Words in statutes can
enlarge or contract their scope as other
changes, in law or in the world, require their
application to new instances or make old
applications anachronistic.”

There is a second issue in Ms. Stephens’s
case, one that could allow her to win however

81

“On L.G.B.T. Rights, the Supreme Court Asks the Question”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
April 25, 2019
It was no snap judgment.

demolish sex discrimination law as we know
it,” Mark Joseph Stern wrote on Slate.

That’s one thing that is clear about the order
the Supreme Court issued on Monday adding
to its docket three cases on whether current
federal law protects L.G.B.T. employees
from being fired for their sexual orientation
or transgender identity.

I don’t mean to single out two writers whose
consistently smart Supreme Court analysis I
admire. I understand the progressive concern
that the court might conclude that judges lack
a legitimate basis for retrospectively writing
“sexual orientation” or “transgender” into
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which
prohibits
discrimination
in
employment “because of” an individual’s sex
(along with race, religion and national
origin). If the court were to conclude that the
statute’s meaning is controlled by what those
who voted for it 55 years ago thought they
were doing, it would eviscerate its own
precedents interpreting Title VII generously
to cover, for example, sexual harassment, not
only of women by men but also between
members of the same sex.

The court had the three petitions under active
review beginning in early January, and the
cases were taken up 11 times at the justices’
weekly private conference. Three or four
“relistings” would not be particularly
noteworthy these days. A typical reason for
such a delay is that a petition has failed to
attract the necessary four votes and some
justices are writing a dissent to explain why
their colleagues should have agreed to take
the case. But 11 conferences, ending not with
a dissenting opinion but with a grant of
review, is highly unusual.

But here’s the thing: The court indicated on
Monday that it is not going to do that. In
granting review of the transgender case, R.G.
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the
justices rejected the questions posed to them
by the employer, which lost in the lower court
and consequently is the petitioner in this case.
The employer, a small chain of funeral homes
in Michigan that dismissed a longtime
employee who was transitioning from male

So something else is clear about Monday’s
order: If the court didn’t make a snap
judgment, neither should we when it comes
to understanding what just happened and
what might come next. I was surprised to see
predictions of doom being offered by
progressive court watchers. “The absolute
worst case scenario,” Ian Millhiser
warned on Think Progress. The cases “could
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to female, is represented by Alliance
Defending Freedom, a prominent Christianright litigating organization. These were the
questions the group told the justices were
presented by the appeal:

of the transition process would involve
dressing and appearing as a woman before
gender reassignment surgery, the owner
replied, “This is not going to work out.” The
owner later testified that he fired Anthony
Stephens because “he was no longer going to
represent himself as a man. He wanted to
dress as a woman.”

“1. Whether the word ‘sex’ in Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination ‘because of
sex’ meant ‘gender identity’ and included
‘transgender status’ when Congress enacted
Title VII in 1964.

There is a body of employment law holding
that differential dress codes for men and
women don’t ordinarily amount to sex
discrimination. So if that’s the question for
the Supreme Court, Aimee Stephens loses on
that score as well.

“2. Whether Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins prohibits employers from applying
sex-specific policies according to their
employee’s sex rather than their gender
identity.”

Both versions of the questions, from the
Alliance Defending Freedom and the court,
invoke the case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. This 1989 decision expanded the
concept of discrimination to hold that an
employer who penalizes an employee who
doesn’t conform to a stereotypical idea of the
proper appearance or behavior for that
person’s gender can be found to violate Title
VII. The precedent has played an important
role in litigation on behalf of gay men and
lesbians, and it will play an important one in
this case as well. The court’s rephrased
question makes it clear that the justices read
Price Waterhouse as encompassing a broad
view of stereotyping, well beyond the dress
code issue. That was the view taken by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in its ruling on behalf of Ms.
Stephens. By discriminating against a
transgender employee, the appeals court said,
an employer is necessarily “imposing its
stereotypical notions of how sexual organs
and gender identity ought to align.”

And here is the single question that the
justices have chosen to answer instead:
“Whether Title VII prohibits discrimination
against transgender people based on (1) their
status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping
under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.”
The difference between the two approaches
to the case is clear. The answer to Alliance
Defending Freedom’s first question is
obviously “no” — gender identity wasn’t on
the screen for Congress or for most of society
in 1964. On the basis of that question, the
transgender plaintiff, Aimee Stephens, loses.
The group’s second question requires a bit
more explanation, but the answer would take
the court to the same place. The funeral home
had a dress code for its funeral directors that
required men to wear business suits and
women to wear jackets and skirts. When
Anthony Stephens, soon to become Aimee,
informed that funeral home’s owner that part
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I have no inside information about what went
on at the court during the prolonged
consideration of this case. But I believe that
there was an extended negotiation among the
justices, aimed at crafting questions that
would open up the case rather than skew it in
the employer’s direction.

five justices who preserved the right to
abortion.
The times, the cases and the court are
different now, of course. But the Casey story
shows us that the justices are capable of
taking great care not to permit overly zealous
advocacy to back them into a corner.

I’m reminded of something that happened a
quarter-century ago when another potential
landmark case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
reached the court. The petition was filed in
late 1991 by abortion-rights advocates who
believed that the court, following the
retirements of its leading liberal justices, was
about to overturn Roe v. Wade. The
advocates’ calculation was that if this was
going to be the outcome, it would be better
for it to happen quickly and decisively, in
time for the 1992 presidential election to
become a referendum on the right to abortion
and to awaken what polls showed to be a
large silent majority favoring abortion rights.
So they asked the court to decide a broad
question: Was Roe v. Wade still good law?

The other two Title VII cases the court
granted on Monday are Bostock v. Clayton
County, Ga. and Altitude Express v. Zarda.
The justices did not reword the questions in
either of these cases. The wording in both is
straightforward and to the point. The Bostock
petition asks “Whether discrimination
against an employee because of sexual
orientation
constitutes
prohibited
employment
discrimination
‘because
of … sex’ within the meaning of Title
VII. …” The Altitude Express petition’s
question is only slightly different: “Whether
the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 … against employment
discrimination ‘because of … sex’
encompasses discrimination based on an
individual’s sexual orientation.”

The court refused to put itself to that all-ornothing test. Instead, it rewrote the question
to address specifically the constitutionality of
the three Pennsylvania abortion restrictions
that were at issue. As I later learned from
internal court correspondence when I was
writing a biography of Justice Harry
Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, the
instigator of this change was Justice David
Souter, who said he wanted to rephrase the
question
“in
such
a
way
as
to avoid overruling Roe.” Justice Souter,
who was then one of two justices recently
appointed by President George H.W. Bush,
went on to provide a crucial vote as one of the

These petitions also spent four months being
listed for conference after conference. My
guess is that they were simply being carried
along while the justices were negotiating
about how to proceed with the transgender
case. These cases clearly merited review. The
employer had won in the Bostock case in the
United States Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit, while the gay employee had won in
the Altitude Express case in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This
is the type of division over the core meaning
of a federal statute that the Supreme Court
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views as its obligation to resolve. While the
court granted review in both cases, it has
consolidated them for a single one-hour
argument, probably in November and
probably on the same day as the transgender
case.

and a judge whose opinions get the attention
of conservatives on the Supreme Court. In the
Second Circuit sexual orientation case, he
concurred with the majority in finding that
the plaintiff, Donald Zarda, had a valid Title
VII claim.

And what happens then? I offer my analysis
less as a prediction than a caution against
jumping to conclusions. But if the court is
true both to the direction of its sexdiscrimination precedents and to ordinary
uses of the English language, all three cases
ought to be easy wins for the plaintiffs. No
need to rely on me; ask Judge José A.
Cabranes of the Second Circuit. He is one of
the judiciary’s more prominent conservatives

“This is a straightforward case of statutory
construction,” Judge Cabranes wrote. “Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination ‘because of sex.’ Zarda’s
sexual orientation is a function of his sex.
Discrimination against Zarda because of his
sexual orientation therefore is discrimination
because of his sex, and is prohibited by Title
VII.”
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“Supreme Court to Rule on Gay, Transgender Employment Rights”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin and Brent Kendall
April 22, 2019
The Supreme Court will hear three cases
concerning whether gay and transgender
people are protected from discrimination on
the job, marking the first major LGBT rights
issue to reach the court since its 2015 opinion
legalizing same-sex marriage.

recognition of same-sex marriage. Justice
Kavanaugh, 54 years old, once clerked for
Justice Kennedy, who enthusiastically
promoted the younger jurist’s career.
Justice Kavanaugh didn’t face such matters
during his years as a judge on a lower court,
but conservatives have tended to interpret
antidiscrimination laws narrowly, typically
resolving ambiguities in employers’ favor.

Lower courts have differed sharply on
whether the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits sex discrimination, necessarily
covers sexual orientation or gender identity.
Congress, unlike some two dozen states,
hasn’t explicitly added those classifications
to federal antidiscrimination laws.

Important as the issues are across the political
spectrum, the Supreme Court has appeared in
no hurry to confront them in recent years. All
three appeals were filed last year and lingered
on the court’s agenda for months beyond the
typical case. At the end, the justices may have
had little choice, as lower courts have issued
conflicting decisions.

The court’s calendar all but ensures decisions
will come in the late spring or early summer
of 2020, injecting a significant social issue—
and likely the makeup of the Supreme Court
itself—into the presidential election season.

Two of the court’s new cases involve gay
people who allege they were fired because of
their sexual orientation.

With four liberal justices expected to read
LGBT-rights claims more broadly, the focus
will be on the court’s conservative wing,
recently bolstered by two Trump appointees
vetted by the president’s social-conservative
allies.

In one, the New York-based Second U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled its own
precedents to allow the late Donald Zarda, a
skydiving instructor, to sue his former
employer. Mr. Zarda said he sometimes told
female customers he was gay to ease their
potential discomfort in being strapped
together with a man for a tandem dive. One
client alleged Mr. Zarda touched her

That places the spotlight squarely on Justice
Brett Kavanaugh, whose predecessor, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, led a closely divided
court through a series of landmark opinions
culminating
with
the
constitutional
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inappropriately and disclosed his sexual
orientation as a way to excuse his behavior, a
claim he denied. Mr. Zarda was fired in 2010
and died in an accident in 2014.

based on “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”—doesn’t address sexual
orientation.
The cases also highlight a reversal in the
federal government’s view of gay rights. The
Obama-era Justice Department argued that
federal civil-rights law protected workers
against sexual-orientation discrimination.
The Trump administration takes the opposite
position.

Chief Judge Robert Katzmann wrote that the
Zarda estate should be permitted to pursue its
lawsuit. “Sexual orientation discrimination is
predicated on assumptions about how
persons of a certain sex can or should be,” he
wrote. Because it “is motivated by an
employer’s
opposition
to
romantic
association between particular sexes,” it
qualifies as “discrimination based on the
employee’s own sex.”

The third case accepted on Monday concerns
a transgender worker and will be considered
separately from the other two. Aimee
Stephens alleges a Detroit funeral home fired
her as a funeral director after she said she was
transitioning and would no longer present as
male after six years with the company. The
employer, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes Inc., said the change in Ms.
Stephens’s gender presentation would violate
its dress code and disrupt the grieving process
for clients.

The second case comes from the Atlantabased 11th Circuit, which rejected
discrimination claims by a gay man fired
from his job as child-welfare services
coordinator for the juvenile court system in
Clayton County, Ga. Gerald Lynn Bostock
alleged his sexual orientation, as well as his
participation in a gay recreational softball
league, led to his termination.

Last year, the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati,
allowed the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to sue on Ms.
Stephens’s behalf.

Last year, a three-judge panel issued a brief
unsigned opinion based on a footnote from a
1979 decision by an earlier court stating that
“discharge for homosexuality is not
prohibited.” That footnote, in turn, relied on
an earlier opinion siding with an insurance
company that in 1969 turned down a male job
applicant because of his “effeminate
characteristics.”

“Neither government agencies nor the courts
have authority to rewrite federal law by
replacing ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity’—a
change with widespread consequences for
everyone,” said an attorney for the employer,
John Bursch of Alliance Defending Freedom,
an evangelical advocacy group. “The EEOC
has elevated its political goals above the
interests of the grieving people that the
funeral home serves.”

The employers in both the New York and
Georgia cases deny they fired the workers
because they were gay, but argue that Title
VII—the employment provision of the Civil
Rights Act that prohibits discrimination
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“What happened to me was wrong, it was
hurtful and it harmed my family. I hope the
Supreme Court will see that firing me
because
I’m
transgender
was
discrimination,” Ms. Stephens said in a
statement released by the ACLU, which
represents her.

decision that upheld sodomy laws. In 2013,
the court voided a federal ban on benefits to
legally married same-sex couples. That
decision paved the way for Obergefell v.
Hodges, the court’s 2015 ruling recognizing
same-sex marriages under the Constitution.
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, a
conservative stalwart, dissented every time.
But in 1998, he wrote one opinion that gayrights advocates cite as a major precedent in
their favor. The court’s unanimous ruling
allowed a male employee on an oil rig to sue
for sex discrimination by other men who
harassed him in ways suggesting they
thought he was gay.

The high court is likely to hear oral
arguments in the fall, with decisions expected
by July 2020.
The court’s series of gay-rights landmark
opinions, all written by Justice Kennedy,
began in 1996 with a decision striking down
a Colorado ballot measure that had
invalidated local laws protecting gay people
from discrimination and prohibited such
protections in the future.

While few lawmakers in 1964 may have
expected the Title VII to cover such conduct,
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils,” Justice Scalia wrote.

In 2003, the court struck down a Texas statute
criminalizing gay sex, overruling a 1986
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“Court to take up LBGT rights in the workplace”
SCOTUS Blog
Amy Howe
April 22, 2019
[Excerpt; some sections omitted]

The trial court threw out Zarda’s Title VII
claim, reasoning that Title VII does not allow
claims alleging discrimination based on
sexual orientation. But the full U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit reversed that
holding, concluding that Title VII does apply
to discrimination based on sexual orientation
because such discrimination “is a subset of
sex discrimination.”

The Supreme Court announced today that it
will weigh in next term on whether federal
employment discrimination laws protect
LGBT employees. After considering a trio of
cases — two claiming discrimination based
on sexual orientation and the third claiming
discrimination based on transgender status —
at 11 consecutive conferences, the justices
agreed to review them. Until today, the cases
slated for oral argument next term had been
relatively low-profile, but this morning’s
announcement means that the justices will
have what will almost certainly be
blockbuster cases on their docket next fall,
with rulings to follow during the 2020
presidential campaign.

Altitude Express took its case to the Supreme
Court last year, asking the justices to weigh
in. In 2017, the justices had denied review
of a similar case, filed by a woman who
alleged that she had been harassed and passed
over for a promotion at her job as a hospital
security officer in Georgia because she was a
lesbian. However, that case came to the court
in a somewhat unusual posture: Neither the
hospital nor the individual employees named
in the lawsuit had participated in the
proceedings in the lower courts, and they had
told the Supreme Court that they would
continue to stay out of the case even if review
were granted, which may have made the
justices wary about reviewing the case on the
merits.

In Altitude Express v. Zarda, the justices will
decide whether federal laws banning
employment discrimination protect gay and
lesbian employees. The petition for review
was filed by a New York skydiving company,
now known as Altitude Express. After the
company fired Donald Zarda, who worked as
an instructor for the company, Zarda went to
federal court, where he contended that he was
terminated because he was gay – a violation
of (among other things) Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which bars
discrimination “because of sex.”

Altitude Express’ case will be consolidated
for one hour of oral argument with the second
case involving the rights of gay and lesbian
employees: Bostock v. Clayton County,
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Georgia. The petitioner in the case, Gerald
Bostock, worked as a child-welfare-services
coordinator in Clayton County, Georgia.
Bostock argued that after the county learned
that he was gay, it falsely accused him of
mismanaging public money so that it could
fire him – when it was in fact firing him
because he was gay.

Bostock went to federal court, arguing that
his firing violated Title VII. The county
urged the court to dismiss the case, arguing
that Title VII does not apply to discrimination
based on sexual orientation. The district court
agreed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11th Circuit upheld that ruling
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“Title VII and LGBT Discrimination: The Path to the High Court”
Law360
Melissa Legault
April 30, 2019
After 11 private conferences during which
the U.S. Supreme Court justices debated
whether to hear the cases, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari[1] in three cases involving
the extent of protection — if any — provided
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against employment-based discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. The court consolidated the two
sexual orientation cases, Altitude Express v.
Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton County,
Georgia, and allocated a total of one hour for
oral argument for both cases.

Background
Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer
to discriminate against an employee “because
of ... sex.” The statute does not on its face
prohibit sexual orientation or gender identity
discrimination, and circuit courts are split as
to whether Title VII’s protection against sexbased discrimination also prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination, with the Second
and Seventh Circuits of the view that Title
VII prohibits sexual orientation- based
discrimination and the Eleventh and Fifth
Circuits reaching the opposite conclusion.

In the gender identity case, R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission et al.,
the court limited its consideration to the
question of whether Title VII prohibits
discrimination against transgender people
based on (1) their status as transgender or (2)
pursuant to the theory of sex stereotyping
announced in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.[2]

In Zarda, a male skydiving instructor whose
employment was allegedly terminated
because of his sexual orientation filed a Title
VII claim against his employer. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the plaintiff was wrongfully terminated
from his job, stating that, “because sexual
orientation is a function of sex and sex is a
protected characteristic under Title VII, it
follows that sexual orientation is also
protected.”

The current federal stance on Title VII and
LGBT discrimination is conflicting, to say
the least. The court’s rulings in these cases
will provide employers with some muchneeded clarity regarding whether federal law
requires that their discrimination policies
protect gay and transgender individuals.

The Second Circuit’s decision was in line
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit’s 2007 holding in Hively v.
Ivy Tech Community College where that
court held that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation violates Title VII. A few
91

months after Zarda was decided, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reached a contrary conclusion in Bostock,
relying on previous circuit precedent.

employer terminated her employment
because of her sexual orientation
(heterosexual) after she made a transphobic
comment on Facebook.

The last of the trio, Harris Funeral Homes,
contemplates whether Title VII implicitly
prohibits gender identity discrimination. In
that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit became the first federal circuit
court of appeals to recognize transgender
discrimination as a form of prohibited sexbased discrimination under Title VII, relying
heavily on the reasoning in Zarda.

The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s Title
VII retaliation claim, holding that, based on
the circuit’s
“unbroken and unequivocal precedents, it is
not ‘reasonable’ in the Fifth Circuit to infer
that Title VII embraces an entirely new
category of persons protected for their sexual
orientation.” The court also dismissed the
plaintiff’s claim that her former employer
violated state law by suppressing her free
expression on grounds that the law does not
cover private employers.

In addition to the trio of cases currently
before the court, other circuit courts have
recently grappled with the issue of whether
Title
VII
protects
against
LGBT
discrimination. For instance, the issue of
sexual orientation discrimination is currently
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. The court heard oral argument
on April 17, 2019, in Horton v. Midwest
Geriatric Management LLC, a case brought
by a man who was offered a job as vice
president of sales and marketing, only to have
the offer rescinded after the company
discovered that he is gay.

This decision comes shortly after the same
circuit’s decision in Wittmer v. Phillips 66
Company. In that discrimination case
involving a transgender plaintiff, the Fifth
Circuit ruled in favor of the employer without
addressing the question of whether Title VII
protects against LGBT discrimination;
however, U.S. Circuit Judge James Ho, who
was nominated by President Donald Trump,
wrote a lengthy and detailed concurrence
analyzing the issue and concluded that Title
VII does not provide such protections.

Further, on April 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit deepened the
circuit split in Bonnie O’Daniel v. Industrial
Services Solutions et al. and held that Title
VII does not prohibit employers from
terminating the employment of straight
workers because of their sexuality,
reaffirming the circuit’s long- standing
position that Title VII does not protect
against sexual orientation discrimination. In
that case, the plaintiff claimed that her

In his concurrence, Judge Ho opined that
“[o]nly the Supreme Court can resolve this
circuit split.” With its decision to grant
certiorari in this trio of cases, the Supreme
Court has chosen to do just that. The court
will hear arguments in these cases next term,
meaning employers can expect to see a
decision by June 2020. Until then, this issue
will continue to be closely watched by the
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nation, with government agencies, Congress
and employers weighing in on the debate.

Not all agencies agree with HHS’ and the
DOJ’s interpretation of Title VII.
Specifically, in response to the other
agencies’ proclamations on the topic, the
acting chair of the EEOC, Victoria Lipnic
(who was appointed by Trump in 2017),
announced that the EEOC plans to continue
prosecuting transgender discrimination
claims in accordance with the agency’s stated
policies.

Federal Agencies Muddied the Waters
The fall of 2018 brought a wave of federal
agency
activity
regarding
LGBT
discrimination protection. For example, in
October 2018, a U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services memo garnered national
attention for defining “sex” to exclude
transgenderism.

The Legislative Branch Weighs In

The memo defines “sex” as “a person’s status
as male or female based on immutable
biological traits identifiable by or before
birth.” In other words, HHS wants to rely on
birth certificates as the main identifier of an
individual’s sex, a policy that would
essentially abolish federal recognition and
protection of transgender individuals. The
memo requests that other federal agencies —
including the U.S. Department of Justice,
U.S. Department of Education and U.S.
Department of Labor — alter their own
understanding of the word “sex” to match
HHS’ proposed definition.

On March 13, 2019, the House Democrats,
spearheaded by Rep. David Cicilline, an
openly gay congressman from Rhode Island,
reintroduced a bill to expand LBGT
discrimination protections. The Equality Act,
first introduced in 2015, would change
existing civil rights legislation to ban
discrimination against LGBT individuals in
employment,
housing
and
public
accommodations, among other areas.
Further, the proposed bill would bar reliance
on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
justification of sexual orientation and
transgender discrimination. The act is
currently being considered in various
committee hearings and a floor vote is
expected in the House by early summer 2019.
Although the bill has a chance to pass in the
House, which has a Democratic majority, it is
unlikely that it would pass in the Republicancontrolled Senate.

Shortly after the HHS memo became public,
the DOJ, appearing before the Supreme Court
on behalf of the federal government, urged
the court in a brief[3] to postpone
consideration of Harris Funeral Homes until
it decides whether to review Zarda and
Bostock because the Sixth Circuit relied
heavily on Zarda in concluding that Title VII
prohibits transgender discrimination.

The American Public Shows Increasing
Support of LGBT Rights

Further, the DOJ contended, consistent with
the HHS memo, that Title VII does not
prohibit employers from discriminating
against employees based on gender identity.

A recent poll[4] from the Public Religion
Research Institute, or PRRI, indicates that a
majority of Americans in every religion,
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party and U.S. state supports policies that
protect against gender identity and sexual
orientation discrimination.

Conclusion
Considering the court’s current makeup and
recent decisions in other employment cases,
it is uncertain how the nine justices will
ultimately rule on whether Title VII prohibits
sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination, but pundits largely believe
that the conservative majority will take a
narrow view in interpreting the extent of Title
VII’s sex-based discrimination prohibitions.
Until the court provides clarity on these
questions, it is important for employers to
remember that, although there are currently
no express federal protections against sexual
orientation or transgender discrimination,
many state and local governments prohibit
such discrimination.

Further, nearly 200 companies — including
Amazon, Apple, PepsiCo, Twitter and Uber
— have decided to take the issue into their
own hands and signed the Business
Statement for Transgender Equality[5]
opposing “any administrative and legislative
efforts to erase transgender protections
through reinterpretation of existing laws and
regulations.”
Even
without
federal
protections in place, corporate America has
chosen to instill its own protections for
employees, with over 80% of Fortune 500
companies prohibiting LGBT discrimination
in their employment policies. Moreover,
many of these companies have publicly
supported the proposed Equality Act now
before Congress.

In fact, over 20 states and Washington, D.C.,
have explicit laws prohibiting LGBT-related
discrimination. Employers are encouraged to
consult with counsel to ensure compliance
with state and local laws regarding
transgender
and
sexual
orientation
discrimination in the workplace. In addition,
employers should continue to use best
practices whenever making adverse hiring
and employment decisions and should
adequately
document
performance
deficiencies or other legitimate concerns
regarding applicants and employees, so they
are able to establish an independent,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
their
employment decisions.

On March 27, 2019, some of America’s most
influential companies weighed in on this
issue at the state level. In a letter,[6]
companies like Amazon, Google and IBM
warned Texas legislators against a pair of
bills that the companies deem discriminatory,
explaining that they would “continue to
oppose any unnecessary, discriminatory, and
divisive measures that would damage Texas’
reputation” including “policies that explicitly
or implicitly allow for the exclusion of
LGBTQ people, or anyone else.”
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“This landmark ruling could bring logic to civil rights laws”

CNN
Caroline Polisi
February 27, 2018
The most important and culturally significant
legal battles are often waged through
piecemeal victories won at a glacial pace -two steps forward, one step back. The federal
Defense of Marriage Act, which was enacted
by Congress in 1996 in an attempt to curb
states from legally recognizing same-sex
marriage, was not ruled unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court until 2013.

law of the land throughout the United States.
In fact, the Justice Department's official
position is that the Civil Rights Act should
not be construed to protect LGBT
individuals, and they filed a brief asserting so
in the Zarda case.
Enacted by Congress in 1964, Title
VII makes it an "unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge ... or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with
respect to his (or her) compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ..."

Consequently, the unwieldy machine that is
"the law," inevitably lags behind the zeitgeist
and develops idiosyncrasies that are
confusing at best, and illogical at worst.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit this week took a bold
step toward correcting this landscape in the
area of employment discrimination law,
which in many jurisdictions illogically holds
that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is distinct from, rather than an
example of, sex discrimination.

The shorthand courts use when analyzing
Title VII sex-discrimination claims is that a
plaintiff alleging disparate treatment in
violation of Title VII must show that he or
she was discriminated against "because of ...
sex."

In Zarda v. Altitude Express, the Second
Circuit ruled with a resounding 10-3 majority
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits not only sex discrimination based
on gender-nonconformity, but also includes a
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Shockingly to some, this
is a controversial decision, and it is not the

The first landmark interpretation of this
language by the Supreme Court came in 1989
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which
paved the way for what we now consider a
"gender stereotyping" claim -- when an
employee is discriminated against for failing
to fit into a gender-conforming mold. The
female plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was
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denied a promotion because of her
nonconformity with stereotypes about how a
woman "should" act. She was told to "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry," and was criticized
for being too "macho." The decision now
stands for the principle that employers cannot
legally discriminate against employees for
failing to adhere to traditional gender norms.

and "sexual orientation discrimination"
would often overlap. Social psychologists
have repeatedly demonstrated that animus
against gender nonconformity is inextricably
linked with animus against sexual orientation
nonconformity. Because these types of
discrimination are often indistinguishable in
the mind of the offender, it is certainly
beyond the capacity of the court process to
decipher such nuances; they must therefore
both be included in the protections of the law.

The controversy in this latest Title VII
litigation still lies where it always does: in the
text of the statute itself. Those who wrote
amicus briefs against the plaintiff in Zarda - including the Trump Justice Department -argue that Title VII was never meant to afford
the LGBT community protection, and to do
so now would be an impermissible expansion
of legislative intent. Never mind that the
Supreme
Court
has
repeatedly admonished against this kind of
argument, or that we now live in a world in
which a woman could marry her same-sex
partner one day, only to be fired for it the next
(an absurdity pointed out specifically by the
majority opinion in Zarda). According to the
Second Circuit, for the purposes of Title VII
protections, discrimination based on sex and
discrimination based on sexual orientation is
a distinction without a difference; both are
included in the statute's prohibitions.

Take the case of Brian Prowel, who was
continually harassed at his factory job in
Western Pennsylvania, including repeatedly
being called "Princess," "Rosebud," "fag,"
and "faggot." In his case, the Third Circuit
noted that even though it was allowing Mr.
Prowel's Title VII claims to proceed under a
sex-discrimination theory, it was very
possible that his harassment had more to do
with his "sexual orientation" than his
"effeminacy."
In keeping with the pace of our cultural
understanding of sex discrimination, in 2015,
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission held, for the first time, that
"sexual orientation is inherently a 'sex-based
consideration;' accordingly an allegation of
discrimination based on sexual orientation is
necessarily
an
allegation
of
sex
discrimination under Title VII." For many,
this was a crucial step in the evolution of our
legal doctrine, which can and should change
with the times.

Gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees'
personal experiences bear out the necessity of
this ruling. It's likely that there will be
significant overlap between the specific
hostility on display against a targeted
employee; if one were to draw a Venn
diagram of motivation, "sex discrimination"

But it may take many more years before this
issue finally makes it to the Supreme Court.
Until that time, there will be a "circuit split"
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on the issue, in which different jurisdictions
will adhere to different standards. Currently
only two Circuits (the Second and Seventh),
those governing the states of New York,
Connecticut, Vermont, Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin, have affirmatively held that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is
prohibited under the Civil Rights Act.

The Supreme Court declined to review a
different case addressing the same issue last
year, but some speculate that Zarda may
prompt the Court to look at the issue anew.
One can only hope that it makes the logical
conclusion that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is and should be prohibited
under Title VII as discrimination "based on ...
sex."
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“Two new petitions call on SCOTUS to decide workplace protections for gays,
lesbians”
Reuters
Alison Frankel
May 31, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court doesn’t have to
explain or justify its decisions to accept or
reject requests for review, but a pair of newly
filed petitions present an awfully strong case
that the moment has come for the justices to
decide whether gay and lesbian employees
are protected from workplace discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

50 years of established precedent” from
every other federal appellate court to have
ruled on the scope of Title VII protection for
gay and lesbian employees. Its petition called
on the Supreme Court to step in to resolve the
circuit split.
The exact same call comes from a second
Supreme Court petition filed this week – this
one from an employee denied the right to sue
his employer under Title VII for anti-gay
discrimination. Gerald Bostock claims he
was fired from his job as a child welfare
services coordinator for a Georgia county’s
juvenile court system when his employer
found out he is gay. On May 10, a three-judge
panel at the 11th Circuit ruled in an
unpublished, per curiam decision that
Bostock cannot sue Clayton County under
Title VII because the law does not bar
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Bostock’s lawyer, Brian Sutherland of
Buckley Beal, had simultaneously asked the
11th Circuit to reconsider en banc its binding
precedent on the scope of Title VII
protection. The 11th Circuit denied that
request when it issued its per curiam
decision. Sutherland then hustled to get his
petition to the Supreme Court a mere two
weeks later.

One petition was filed by Altitude Express, a
New York skydiving outfit accused of firing
instructor Donald Zarda after he told a
customer he was gay. In February, you may
recall, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Zarda’s estate could bring
Title VII claims against Altitude Express
because the law’s prohibition against sex
discrimination encompasses discrimination
based on sexual orientation. To simplify
ruthlessly: The 2nd Circuit, like the en banc
7th Circuit in 2017’s Hively v. Ivy Tech said
its conclusion was the logical outgrowth of
the Supreme Court’s prohibition on gender
stereotyping in 1989’s Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins and recognition in 1998’s Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services that Title VII
protects both men and women from
discrimination.
Altitude Express, represented by Saul Zabell
of Zabell & Associates, said the 7th and 2nd
Circuits’ decisions “departed from more than
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Sutherland and his client are asking the
Supreme Court to confirm that the 11th
Circuit was wrong and the 2nd and 7th
Circuits correctly interpreted its precedent in
Hopkins and Oncale. “The court must grant
the writ of certiorari in this case not only to
resolve the circuit split and prevent further
erosion of Price Waterhouse and Oncale by
the lower courts struggling with how to apply
them, but also because justice demands the
unequivocal
determination
that
discrimination against an employee because
of sexual orientation is discrimination
“because of ... sex” in violation of Title VII,”
the petition said.

None of this is a guarantee, of course, that the
justices will grant either or both when they
conference on the petitions in September,
after their summer break. Last December, the
Supreme Court denied a petition for review
of a different 11th Circuit ruling on Title VII
and sexual orientation, 2017’s Evans v.
Georgia Regional, despite an alreadyexisting split between the 7th and 11th
Circuits. On the other hand, the Evans case
presented the procedural complication - the
defendant, a hospital, disputed the 11th
Circuit’s jurisdiction and refused to
participate in the appeals court or at the
Supreme Court – that may have
compromised it as a vehicle to decide an issue
with broad nationwide implications. And the
circuit split has only deepened since the
justices turned down the Evans case, with the
en banc 2nd Circuit ruling in Zarda and the
11th Circuit decision in Bostock.

In other words, both an employer and an
employee are asking the justices to resolve
entrenched appellate disagreement – based
on competing interpretations of the Supreme
Court’s own precedent - about workplace
rights of gays and lesbians. Both petitions
also highlight disagreement within President
Trump’s own administration about whether
Title VII shields gay and lesbian employees
from discrimination. In the 2nd Circuit’s en
banc consideration of the Zarda case, the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission sided with Zarda’s estate,
reiterating arguments the EEOC pioneered in
a 2015 case that informed the 7th Circuit’s
Hively opinion. The Justice Department
submitted a competing amicus brief, arguing
that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is different from discrimination
based on sex. If even the government can’t
agree on the scope of Title VII protection, the
briefs said, the Supreme Court must provide
clarity.

“It’s time,” said Bostock counsel Sutherland.
“The more time that goes by without clarity
from the Supreme Court, the more confusion
there will be in the lower courts.”
Donald Zarda’s estate, meanwhile, will
oppose Supreme Court review, according to
its lawyer, Gregory Antollino. “I think more
circuits need to weigh in,” he told me, citing
a pending Title VII discrimination suit by a
gay employee at the 8th Circuit. “There have
to be more than three circuits before the
Supreme Court jumps in.”
Clayton County, the defendant in the Bostock
case, was represented at the 11th Circuit
by Freeman Mathis & Gary.
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“11th Circ. Draws Judge’s Ire With En Banc Review Refusal”
Law360
Kat Green
July 18, 2018
The full Eleventh Circuit on Wednesday
declined to hear whether a gay Clayton
County, Georgia, government employee was
discriminated against, prompting one of its
judges to pen a blistering dissent that
proclaimed her peers relied on “the
precedential equivalent of an Edsel with a
missing engine.”

when it comes to an issue that affects so many
people,” Judge Rosenbaum wrote. “I
continue to firmly believe that Title VII
prohibits discrimination against gay and
lesbian individuals because they fail to
conform to their employers’ views when it
comes to whom they should love.”
She said that, her personal opinion aside, she
was dissenting for the “even more basic
reason” that regardless how the court does
eventually rule on the issue, it should at least
permit the parties to fight it out in court so the
judges can have a “reasoned and principled
explanation for our position on this issue —
something we have never done.”

Ostensibly, Wednesday’s order was a routine
one-liner in which the appeals court reported
that, after a vote of its judges, it had decided
not to take up an appeal by Gerald Lynn
Bostock, a former child welfare services
worker who claimed his firing was
discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
But it came together with a six-page dissent
from U.S. Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum,
who excoriated her fellow judges for keeping
in place the underlying panel decision —
which affirmed the lower court’s finding that
Title VII doesn’t protect gay and lesbian
individuals — saying the court was relying
on a 39-year-old precedent that has since
been abrogated by a U.S. Supreme Court
ruling.

She noted that the Second and Seventh
Circuits in recent months have taken up the
same issue en banc, and that the Eleventh
should be no different. The Seventh Circuit
became the first federal appellate court in the
country to extend Title VII protections to
sexual orientation with a decision in April
2017, and the Second Circuit broke with its
own precedent to find the same in February
of this year, according to decisions in those
cases.

“I cannot explain why a majority of our Court
is content to rely on the precedential
equivalent of an Edsel with a missing engine,

In the instant suit, Bostock said that he had
been working as a child welfare services
coordinator for the southern Atlanta
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metropolitan area county when he started
playing in a gay recreational softball league.
After several comments from people at work,
he was subjected to an internal audit on the
funds he managed, according to filings in the
case.

Judge Rosenbaum wrote that Price
Waterhouse abrogated Blum and requires the
conclusion that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against gay and lesbian people
because their sexual preferences don’t
conform to their employers views of who
their partners should be, according to the
dissent filed Wednesday.

That audit, Bostock alleged, was a pretext for
discrimination against him for his sexual
orientation and his failure to conform to a
gender stereotype, and the termination that
followed was not because of the audit’s
findings but because he was gay, he said.

At the very least, she said, the eight million
or more people who publicly identify as gay
or lesbian in America are affected by such
policies, so the “legitimacy of the law
demands we explain ourselves.”

He filed suit in August 2016, but Clayton
County won dismissal of the case after it
argued that the Civil Rights Act doesn’t
protect gay and lesbian employees in those
contexts, according to filings in the case.

Bostock has already filed a petition for
certification of the issue to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The high court in December declined
to review an Eleventh Circuit ruling in a
similar case, in which worker Jameka Evans
accused Georgia Regional Hospital of
discriminating against her because she’s a
lesbian and doesn’t dress in line with
feminine stereotypes.

On appeal, the three-judge Eleventh Circuit
panel cited the Fifth Circuit's 1979 ruling in
Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp. in which that court
held that “discharge for homosexuality is not
prohibited by Title VII," saying that because
the Eleventh Circuit has cited that precedent
in the past, it cannot now overrule that
finding without an intervening Supreme
Court or en banc decision.

Bostock’s attorney Brian J. Sutherland of
Buckley Beal LLP said his team agrees with
Judge Rosenbaum’s view that the issue is one
of extraordinary importance, not only for his
client, but also for all the other gay and
lesbian people working in America.

In her dissent, Judge Rosenbaum noted that
an intervening decision has actually been
issued, in the form of the high court’s 1989
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , in
which the court found that former accounting
firm employee Ann Hopkins was
discriminated against when she was denied
partnership because she didn’t fit the firm’s
picture of how a female employee should
look and act.

“We certainly hope that the Supreme Court
will grant Mr. Bostock’s petition and answer
this important question that the Eleventh
Circuit declined again to consider en banc,”
he told Law360 on Wednesday.
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A representative for Clayton County didn’t
immediately respond to a request for
comment late Wednesday.

Clayton County is represented by Jack R.
Hancock and William H. Buechner Jr. of
Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP.

Bostock is represented by Brian J. Sutherland
and Thomas J. Mew IV of Buckley Beal LLP.

The case is Gerald Lynn Bostock v. Clayton
County Board of Commissioners et al., case
number 17-13801, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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“11th Circuit Joins Others in Holding Sexual Orientation Discrimination Not
Covered Title VII”
Schiff Hardin
Julie Furer Stahr
March 21, 2017
Joining nearly all other federal circuit courts,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has held that Title VII does not cover
discrimination
based
on
sexual
orientation. Evans v. Georgia Regional
Hospital, 2017 WL 943925 (11th Cir. March
10, 2017). While closing the door on Title VII
sexual orientation discrimination claims, the
court re-affirmed that other theories of sex
discrimination, such as gender nonconformity and same-sex discrimination,
remain actionable.

also began to harass her. Evans eventually
resigned.
Evans filed suit against the hospital and
others, claiming she was discriminated
against based on her sexual orientation and
gender non-conformity, and retaliated against
after she complained. Her claims were
initially addressed by a magistrate judge.
With respect to Evans’s claim of
discrimination based on her sexual
orientation (her status as a gay female), the
magistrate judge determined that Title VII
“was not intended to cover discrimination
against homosexuals.” The magistrate judge
further concluded that her gender nonconformity claim was “just another way to
claim discrimination based on sexual
orientation,” no matter how it was titled, and
thus that claim too was barred. The
magistrate judge also recommended
dismissal of the retaliation claim; because
sexual orientation discrimination is not
prohibited under Title VII, Evans did not
allege opposition to an unlawful employment
practice when she complained. Over Evans’
objection, the district court adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation in full and
dismissed the case.

Jameka Evans, who is a lesbian, was a
security guard at Georgia Regional Hospital.
Evans alleged that she was denied equal pay
and work, harassed, and physically assaulted.
According to Evans, it was evident that she
identified with the male gender due to such
things as her wearing a male uniform, haircut
and shoes. Furthermore, she claims she was
subjected to a hostile work environment
because her status as a gay female did not
comport with her superiors’ gender
stereotypes. According to Evans, she had
doors closed on her, she was subjected to
scheduling problems and shift changes, and
her work equipment was tampered with. She
also claimed a less qualified employee was
promoted to become her supervisor, who then

Evans appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The
court first held that Evans’ gender non103

conformity claim should not have been
dismissed. A gender non-conformity claim is
not “just another way to claim discrimination
based on sexual orientation,” according to the
court, but rather is a separate cause of action
available under Title VII. Although Evans’
complaint did not plead facts sufficient to
suggest that her decision to present herself in
a masculine manner led to any adverse
employment actions, the court allowed Evans
to amend her complaint to try to sufficiently
plead these facts.

court’s opinion notes the decisions from all
other federal circuits (except D.C.) holding
that sexual orientation discrimination is not
actionable under Title VII. While the law in
the D.C. Circuit is less clear, indications can
be found in earlier decisions that the court is
trending in the same direction.
What Now?
The near-unanimous exclusion of sexual
orientation protection under federal law may
or may not be significant for employers,
depending on the jurisdiction. Initially, as
noted in this case, non-traditional sex
discrimination theories can overlap making it
difficult to decipher, certainly at the
management and human resources level,
what type of conduct may or may not be
prohibited under federal law. Moreover, in
many
states,
sexual
orientation
discrimination is expressly prohibited at the
state and local level, and employers in these
jurisdictions can face similar or even greater
legal penalties than under federal law. Thus,
the practical effect of the roadblock under
Title VII may be a rise in state court claims
in some states by employees seeking to bring
sexual orientation-based claims. For all these
reasons, the sensible approach from both a
legal and personnel perspective is to continue
to strive for respect and fairness for all
employees.

The court next addressed the sexual
orientation discrimination claim. Citing legal
precedent, the court held that Title VII does
not permit such a claim: “[W]e are bound to
follow a binding precedent in this Circuit
unless and until it is overruled by this court
en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Evans
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has
already
held
that
both
same-sex
discrimination claims, and gender nonconformity discrimination claims, are
allowed under Title VII, and that these
decisions should also include within their
purview
sexual
orientation-based
claims. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
The Eleventh Circuit did not agree, finding
that those Supreme Court decisions were not
sufficiently on-point to interfere with
established legal precedent. In doing so, the
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“2nd Circuit demolishes key DOJ argument against workplace protection for gays”
Reuters
Alison Frankel
February 26, 2018
The en banc 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals stood up against workplace
prejudice on Monday, ruling in Zarda v.
Altitude Express that the Civil Rights Act
bars discrimination based on employees’
sexual orientation. The 2nd Circuit’s decision
deepens an existing circuit split on whether
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which bars
on sex discrimination, encompasses
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The 10 judges in the 2nd Circuit majority in
Zarda lined up with the en banc 7th Circuit in
2017’s Hively v. Ivy Tech Community
College - and against a divided three-judge
panel at the 11th Circuit, which said in
2017’s Evans
v.
Georgia
Regional
Hospital that Title VII does not protect gay
and lesbian workers. Three judges dissented.

Altitude counsel Saul Zabell of Zabell &
Associates told my Reuters colleague Dan
Wiessner that he actually agreed with the 2nd
Circuit on the scope of Title VII protection
for gay and lesbian employees, but that his
client didn’t discriminate against Zarda based
on his sexual orientation.
But if the justices eventually have to decide
whether discrimination against gay and
lesbian employees is a form of sex
discrimination – and therefore a violation of
Title VII protections – the 2nd Circuit’s
decision will be important not just for its
affirmation
that
sex
discrimination
encompasses discrimination against gays and
lesbians but also for its demolition of the lead
argument to the contrary. As I’ve said, the
7th Circuit’s Hively ruling, which was, in
turn, based on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s 2015 ruling
in Foxx v. Baldwin, shrewdly used Supreme
Court precedent to show why workplace bias
against gays and lesbians is a form of sex
discrimination. The 2nd Circuit in Zarda
explained why Hively critics, led by the U.S.
Justice Department, are promoting a
misguided framework.

There’s no guarantee when, if ever, the U.S.
Supreme Court will step in. The justices
denied a petition last year for review of the
11th Circuit’s decision, which had a weird
procedural defect because the hospital
insisted it was never properly served so the
appellate courts didn’t have jurisdiction. The
community college defendant in the 7th
Circuit case didn’t petition the Supreme
Court, and it’s not clear whether Altitude
Express, a skydiving company accused of
firing Donald Zarda after it learned he was
gay, will ask the justices to take its case.

The critics’ argument, as the Justice
Department laid it out in an amicus brief in
the Zarda case is that workplace sex
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discrimination is defined by disparate
treatment of male and female employees. If
an employer, for instance, pays a woman less
than a man with the same experience, that’s
discrimination. The test, according to this
theory, is to compare workers who are the
same in every way except for their gender.
And to figure out if sex discrimination
encompasses prejudice against gays and
lesbians, this theory goes, you don’t ask
whether employers treat lesbian employees
differently than straight women and gay
employees different than straight men but
whether employers treats gays and lesbians
similarly.

keep the sexual orientation constant (as
gay).”
The 2nd Circuit majority in Zarda said the
government is pushing the wrong
comparison: The correct test doesn’t compare
gay men to lesbians but rather considers
disparate treatment
between lesbian
employees
and
heterosexual
male
employees; or gay men to heterosexual
women.
The court looked at the Supreme Court’s
1978 decision in City of Los Angeles v.
Manhart, which struck down a city water
department rule requiring female employees
to contribute more than men to the employee
pension fund because women live longer.
The justices concluded that life expectancy
was a proxy for sex, so the rule violated Title
VII. Similarly, in 1989’s Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins the Supreme Court used a
comparison test to conclude Title VII
protects employees who don’t conform to
gender stereotypes, in the case of a female
auditor who claimed she didn’t make partner
because she was as brusque and aggressive as
male counterparts.

In other words, according to proponents of
this theory, discrimination based on sexual
orientation is only sex discrimination if an
employer is biased against gays or lesbians –
but not if it’s equally inhospitable to men and
women who are attracted to people of the
same sex.
“The but-for ‘comparison can’t do its job of
ruling in sex discrimination as the actual
reason for the employer’s decision … if
we’re not scrupulous about holding
everything constant except the plaintiff’s
sex,’” the Justice Department wrote in its
Zarda amicus brief, quoting 7th Circuit Judge
Diane Sykes’ dissent in the Hively case. “The
EEOC and the 7th Circuit majority fail to
hold everything else constant because their
hypothetical changes both the employee’s
sex (from male to female) and his sexual
orientation (from gay to straight). The proper
comparison would be to change the
employee’s sex (from male to female) but to

Based on that precedent, the 2nd Circuit said,
the question to be answered in the
comparison test isn’t whether employers treat
gays and lesbians the same way but whether
sexual orientation is a function of sex, like
life expectancy or “ladylike” behavior. Using
the test advocated by the government (and
Judge Sykes in her Hively dissent) “would
not illustrate whether a particular stereotype
is sex dependent but only whether the
employer discriminates against gender non-
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conformity in only one gender,” the 2nd
Circuit said. “Instead, just as Price
Waterhouse compared a gender nonconforming woman to a gender conforming
man, both of whom were aggressive and did
not wear makeup or jewelry, the Hively court
properly determined that sexual orientation is
sex dependent by comparing a woman and a
man with two different sexual orientations,
both of whom were attracted to women.”

in a case in which the EEOC appeared as an
amicus.
DOJ’s reward for meddling is the 2nd
Circuit’s very firm rejection of its lead
argument. That doesn’t mean, of course, that
the government can’t or won’t continue to
push its comparison test theory in other
circuits or, if it comes to that, the Supreme
Court. Justice, moreover, has other
arguments for why the prohibition on sex
discrimination doesn’t cover gay and lesbian
employees, most notably Congress’s refusal
to shield gays and lesbians against prejudice
in the workplace.

The law, according to the 2nd Circuit, leads
to an inescapable destination: “To determine
whether a trait operates as a proxy for sex, we
ask whether the employee would have been
treated differently ‘but for’ his or her sex,”
wrote Chief Judge Robert Katzmann for the
majority. “In the context of sexual
orientation, a woman who is subject to an
adverse employment action because she is
attracted to women would have been treated
differently if she had been a man who was
attracted to women. We can therefore
conclude that sexual orientation is a function
of sex and, by extension, sexual orientation
discrimination is a subset of sex
discrimination.”

As Judge Gerard Lynch wrote Monday in
the lead dissent to the 2nd Circuit’s majority
opinion in Zarda, it would sure be great if
Congress were suddenly to pass such a law.
(He said he was speaking as a private citizen;
as a judge, he said, he was constrained to
conclude that Title VII, as written, “did not,
and does not, prohibit discrimination against
people because of their sexual orientation.”)
But absent congressional action, it’s up to the
courts to decide the scope of the law – and
Title VII’s aegis is expanding.

The Justice Department, as you probably
recall, muscled into the Zarda case without an
invitation. The 2nd Circuit had asked the
EEOC to submit an amicus brief in the
private dispute. The EEOC, operating at the
time with a Democratic majority, sides with
Zarda and its own precedent from the 2015
Baldwin case. The Justice Department broke
with tradition to assert a competing argument

“Legal doctrine evolves,” the Zarda majority
said. “Applying (Supreme Court) precedents
to sexual orientation discrimination, it is clear
that there is ‘no justification in the statutory
language ... for a categorical rule excluding’
such claims from the reach of Title VII.
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“2nd Circuit (again) finds anti-gay discrimination legal under Title VII”

Washington Blade
Chris Johnson
April 18, 2017
In a case filed by a now deceased gay
skydiver who alleged sexual-orientation
discrimination in the workforce, the U.S.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals on Tuesday
declined to accept the legal argument that
anti-gay discrimination is prohibited under
current federal civil rights law.

still ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the basis
that the nature of the discrimination he faced
was sex stereotyping.
The decision stands in contrast to the
recent groundbreaking “en banc” decision by
the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals that
determined
anti-gay
discrimination in the workforce amounts to
sex discrimination under current law. A
growing number of trial courts and the U.S.
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission have also reached that
conclusion.

In a 13-page decision, the three-judge panel
cites a 2000 decision in the Simonton case, a
2nd Circuit ruling that determined Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of the 1964, which
bars sex discrimination in the workforce,
doesn’t apply to sexual orientation. As a
result of that precedent, the panel concludes
Title VII cannot be applied in the pending
case, named Zarda v. Altitude Express.

The 2nd Circuit case was filed by Donald
Zarda, a gay skydiver who alleged he was
terminated from his position at Altitude
Express for disclosing his sexual orientation
to his client. In response, the company
maintained the client “had various
complaints about Zarda’s behavior” other
than disclosure of his sexual orientation and
he was fired because “he failed to provide an
enjoyable experience for a customer.”
According to media reports, the client
accused him of fondling her in mid-air.

The unanimous ruling concludes that
precedent “can only be overturned by the
entire Court sitting en banc,” which would
require consideration of the case by the full
court as opposed to the three-judge panel.
It’s the second time within a month the 2nd
Circuit has found sexual-orientation
discrimination is permitted under federal
civil rights law. Last month in the case
Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, a different
three-judge panel found that precedent
precluded the court from determining that
anti-gay bias is illegal, although the judges

According to the ruling, Zarda died in a
skydiving accident before the case went to
trial, and two executors of his estate have
replaced him as plaintiff. Zarda’s obituary
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states he died in Switzerland in 2014 as he
was pursuing European Union citizenship.

The three-judge panel consists of U.S. Circuit
Judge Dennis Jacobs, a George H.W. Bush
appointee; U.S. Circuit Judge Robert Sack, a
Clinton appointee; and U.S. Senior Judge
Gerard Lynch, an Obama appointee.

At trial court, Zarda contended his firing was
illegal both under Title VII and New York
state
law,
which
explicitly
bars
discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The trial court rejected his Title
VII claim and also ruled in favor of Altitude
Express under state law, saying Zarda didn’t
meet the burden of proof he could keep his
job if only he wasn’t gay.

Gregory Antollino, the New York-based
attorney representing the Zarda estate, told
the Washington Blade his legal team intends
to file for “en banc” review of the decision
before the full Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit determines Zarda may be
qualified for relief under Title VII because
federal law has a less stringent “motivatingfactor” test of causation, but nonetheless the
judges say they can’t rule for him because of
precedent within the circuit.
Although judges in the Christiansen case
granted the plaintiff relief on the basis that he
suffered discrimination on sex-stereotyping
claims, the Second Circuit in the Zarda case
determines it cannot reach a similar
conclusion.
“That route is unavailable to Zarda, since, as
explained above, the district court found that
Zarda failed to establish the requisite
proximity between his termination and his
failure to conform to gender stereotypes, and
Zarda did not challenge that determination on
appeal,” the decision says. “Consequently,
Zarda may receive a new trial only if Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination
encompasses discrimination based on sexual
orientation — a result foreclosed by
Simonton.”
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“Trump’s Battle Over LGBT Discrimination is Just Beginning”
The Atlantic
Emma Green
July 28, 2017
LGBT issues have been all over the news this
week. On Wednesday, President Trump
announced a ban on transgender Americans
serving in the military. That evening, the
Department of Justice made another
significant move in the fight over LGBT
rights, albeit with less flash than a tweet
storm: It filed an amicus brief in a major
case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, arguing that
it’s not illegal to fire an employee based on
his or her sexual orientation under federal
law.

that isn’t there and accused the Obama
administration of enforcing its political
agenda through executive fiat. In effect,
that’s exactly what Trump’s DOJ argued in
its brief.
While this case will ultimately be decided by
the courts, it’s a sign of conflict ahead in the
long-brewing battle over LGBT rights and
the meaning of sex discrimination. It also
shows the limits of executive action in
contested areas of law. The Obama
administration may have believed gay people
should be protected by federal civil-rights
statutes, but it may prove challenging to
make that interpretation stick now that a new
party controls Washington.

LGBT advocates were quick to decry the
DOJ’s position as bigotry. But there’s a
deeper context here: The brief was a throwdown in nuanced fight about the nature of the
administrative state. During the Obama
years, federal agencies slowly began
expanding their interpretation of sex
discrimination, which is prohibited by a
number of civil-rights laws. The Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission, the
independent agency focused on workplace
discrimination, arguably pushed the
definition of sex discrimination further than
any other regulatory body. In 2015, the
EEOC ruled that Title VII, the civil-rights
statute that protects workers, covers bias
based on sexual orientation; it took a similar
position in Zarda. Critics argued that this
interpretation reads something into the law

In 2010, a skydiving instructor named
Donald Zarda lost his job with Altitude
Express, Inc., after he told a client about his
sexual orientation. As a three-judge panel of
the Second Circuit noted in its ruling on the
case this spring, “Zarda often informed
female clients of his sexual orientation—
especially when they were accompanied by a
husband or boyfriend—in order to mitigate
any awkwardness that might arise from the
fact that he was strapped tightly to the
woman.” Zarda sued, arguing in part that
Altitude Express violated Title VII by firing
Zarda based on his sexual orientation. He lost
in district court and on initial appeal. Now,
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the case is being heard by the full Second
Circuit.

Human Rights. “That likely required a high
degree of vetting at a very high level in the
Justice Department.” Gupta led the Justice
Department’s civil-rights division during the
final years of the Obama administration.

Enter the battling briefs. In June, the EEOC
weighed in supporting Zarda, arguing that
sexual-orientation-based discrimination is by
definition based on sex and involves sex
stereotyping, which has long been prohibited
by the Supreme Court. A month later, the
DOJ filed a brief making the exact opposite
argument. “The sole question here is
whether, as a matter of law, Title VII reaches
sexual-orientation
discrimination,”
the
department wrote. “It does not, as has been
settled for decades. Any efforts to amend
Title VII’s scope should be directed to
Congress rather than the courts.”

The sex-discrimination provision of federal
civil-rights laws has always been
controversial, but it has become even more
charged in recent years. Cases on this topic
regularly bubble up through the court system,
and some have made it to the top: This spring,
the Supreme Court planned to take up a highprofile case concerning a transgender student
in Virginia, but punted when the Trump
administration back-pedaled the Obama
administration’s previous guidance on how to
deal with this kind of issue in schools. Court
battles over how to interpret “sex
discrimination” have become a proxy war
over LGBT rights.

In other words, the government has two
opposing opinions on one case, and two
opposite interpretations of how the same law
should be applied. “It is super wacky, yes,”
said Justin Levitt, an associate dean and
professor of law at Loyola Law School in Los
Angles. “It is very unusual. The federal
government usually makes great efforts to be
on the same page of this sort of thing.”

Unfortunately, there is not a high wall
between law and politics sometimes. That’s
the case on both sides here,” said Michael
Harper, a professor of law at Boston
University. “This is a question of statutory
interpretation.
…
Whether
the
statute should [prohibit
LGBT
discrimination]
and
whether
the
statute doesare two different questions.”

Neither the DOJ nor the EEOC is a party in
the case—both agencies were essentially
offering advice to the court on what to do.
That’s part of what makes the battling briefs
significant: The DOJ chose to take up this
fight when it didn’t have to.

LGBT-rights advocates argue that DOJ-style
reasoning is straightforwardly incorrect and
fundamentally grounded in prejudice. When
the Zarda brief came out, the Human Rights
Campaign called it “a shameful retrenchment
of an outmoded interpretation that forfeits
faithful interpretation of current law to
achieve a politically driven and legally

“This Justice Department felt strongly
enough that they took the affirmative step to
weigh in to undercut the EEOC’s position,”
said Vanita Gupta, the president and CEO of
the Leadership Conference on Civil and
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specious result.” Former Attorney General
Eric Holder weighed in on Twitter:

legislature that passed it,” he said. While the
sex-discrimination issue is part of an
important debate about administrative law,
it’s not an option to put off interpreting and
enforcing statutes while waiting on Congress
to pass clearer legislation, he said: “You have
to interpret statutes somehow.”

Trump team within 24 hours reverses
Obama DOJ positions for gays
seeking employment and trans people
seeking to serve. This is 2017 not
1617

The downside of that approach is that
elections regularly boot parties out of power.
If one administration has taken an aggressive
stance on a controversial issue, it’s inevitable
that their opponents will reverse course when
they get in office. “There are limits, when the
administration changes, to what the executive
can do without Congress,” said Harper. “To
have secure change, you have to have
congressionally passed legislation.” Even
though the circumstances of the DOJ’s brief
were unusual, the context was unsurprising.
“I can’t say that I’m altogether shocked,” said
Gupta. “I’m disappointed, obviously.”

— Eric Holder (@EricHolder) July
27, 2017
But according to Harper, the law is not so
settled. This “is a fine legal brief,” he said. “It
makes good legal arguments.” When
lawmakers passed Title VII in 1964, they
weren’t thinking of sexual orientation, the
DOJ brief argues. Until very recently, courts
of appeal and the EEOC agreed. Efforts to
pass explicit protections for gay, lesbian, and
bisexual workers have also always failed in
Congress, effectively ratifying legislators’
intent to keep the law the way it is. “One can
take this position … without being bigoted or
prejudiced,” Harper said.

In this particular case, the Second Circuit will
decide who’s right, but there’s drama ahead.
“This isn’t a good look for the federal
government. It is unusual and conflictseeking,” said Levitt. “The decision to
independently file does not reflect a lot of
respect for another federal agency with a
whole lot of enforcement power.”

While politics might have motivated the
arguments in the Trump administration’s
brief—they “play to the political beliefs, and
I would say prejudice, of their base,” Harper
said—“that doesn’t make them bad legal
arguments.”

The EEOC isn’t obliged to change how it
does business just because the DOJ has
weighed in, Levitt said: It has binding
authority in disputes raised by federalgovernment employees, and it can continue
offering advice based on its current
interpretation of Title VII in other cases.
What’s more likely to happen is a war of
attrition. The two agencies “will stand

Levitt, who previously led the Department of
Justice’s efforts on workplace discrimination
as a deputy-assistant attorney general in its
civil-rights division, disagreed.
“It is not a crazy liberal [argument] … to say
that what the words of the statute mean aren’t
bound to what was in the heads of the
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fuming at each other” until the Second
Circuit decides Zarda, Levitt said, and after
that, the “fuming will continue.”

Department of Justice and the EEOC, Levitt
said, but the commission surely can’t be
happy that another agency stepped on its turf.
There will be “a lot of frostier emails,” he
said. “I’m sure about that.”

It’s impossible to know how this legal throwdown will affect the relationship between the
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